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This Article takes a fresh look at the misalignment of interests between
class attorneys and their clients. Specifically, it examines the class attorneys'
opportunity for shirking and for striking collusive settlements with corporate
defendants. Both case law and scholarly writings offer numerous solutions to
this misalignment of interests; yet, those solutions suffer from serious flaws.
Professors Harel and Stein examine the reasons for that failure and propose a
new solution that overcomes the class action agency problem. They argue that
the law should resolve this problem by choosing between two basic paradigms
of class action lawyering: Attorney-as-Owner and Attorney-as-Servant
(Ownership and Servantship). The Ownership paradigm seeks to align the
attorney's and the claimants' interests by giving the attorney a proprietary
right in the action (usually, through a contingent-fee arrangement). The
Servantship paradigm attains this alignment through the attorney's supervision
and monitoring, coupled with penalties for inadequate performance. Professors
Harel and Stein analyze these paradigms by rigorously identifying the
attorney's "conflict-of-interests differential" and by juxtaposing the two
paradigmatic attempts to bring this differential down to zero. Subsequently,
they develop a new competition-based mechanism that operates under the
Servantship paradigm and aligns the interests of class attorneys and their
clients.
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1. PREFACE
Attorneys must represent their clients loyally. This duty is fundamental to
the attorney-client relationship. In class actions, however, this duty is
notoriously difficult to enforce because members of the suing class-the
clients-are unable to select and monitor their attorney. This inability creates a
serious agency problem. The class attorney's egoistic incentive is to maximize
his or her fees-awarded by the court if the action succeeds-with a minimized
time-and-effort investment. This objective does not align with a both zealous
and time-consuming prosecution of the class action, aimed at maximizing the
amount of recovery for the class members. The attorney may attain this egoistic
objective through shirking, by not investing enough effort into representing his
or her clients. He or she may also attain this objective in a more malicious way,
by striking a collusive settlement with the corporate defendant. This
misalignment of interests between the class attorney and the class members is
both manifestly unjust and inefficient. It is unjust because it does not provide
adequate remedy to the victims of wrongs; it is inefficient because it dilutes the
deterrence of corporate wrongdoers.
This handicap can only be remedied by setting the appropriate incentives
under which representing the clients loyally would be in the attorney's best
interest. In both positive law and academic literature, these incentives largely
fall into the Attorney-as-Owner (or Ownership) paradigm. They seek to align
the attorney's self-interest with that of the class members by turning the
attorney-in exchange for her or his services-into a co-owner of the action
(usually, through a contingent-fee mechanism).
The Ownership paradigm, however, is both logically and operationally
unnecessary. Any incentive that a legal system can create by positive payoffs
can also be set through negative payoffs: a stick and a carrot are two equally
functional sides of the same economic coin. If a $10 remuneration induces a
rational person to act in a socially desirable way, an imposition of a $10 fine
upon those who fail to act in that way would produce equally good results. The
Ownership paradigm is also flawed in its substance. There is only one, highly
unrealistic, scenario in which this approach fully eliminates the class action
agency problem. In this scenario, a prospective class counsel purchases the
action from the members of the suing class at the highest market price and
subsequently prosecutes it as his or her own lawsuit.
Based on these simple insights, this Article advocates a shift to an
economically new-but ideologically old-paradigm of class action advocacy:
that of Attorney-as-Servant (or Servantship). Under the Servantship paradigm,
attorneys seeking to represent class members must credibly commit themselves
to loyalty. The Servantship paradigm elicits this credible commitment by
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offering a compulsory auction mechanism that features a set of rules. Under
these rules, prospective class attorneys participate in a compulsory auction in
which they file bids specifying the minimum recovery amount for the class
members and the requested fee (the "auction rule"). The competing attorneys
also commit themselves to a rigorous penalty system that determines which
shortfalls between the actual and the promised recovery amounts would
manifest an inadequate representation of the suing class-a case in which the
attorney would normally be denied her or his fee (the "fee-forfeiture rule").
Under these and some supplementing conditions-featuring an absolute ban on
economically inadequate settlements-the attorney promising the class
members the highest recovery amount for the lowest fee would win the auction.
Specifically, our auction would create competition among prospective class
attorneys by granting control over the action to the highest bidder, namely, to
the attorney willing to sue the defendant for the largest amount of money. This
stated amount would bind the attorney only: the court would be free to award
the class members any amount it deems adequate. Under the fee-forfeiture rule,
an attorney who sued for an unreasonably exaggerated amount would be denied
his or her fee. We provide a rigorous definition for an unreasonably
exaggerated amount. This definition is based upon comparison between the
recovery amount actually awarded by the court and the auction offers filed by
other attorneys. For example, in a case in which the auction-winning attorney
sued the defendant for $50,000,000, but ultimately recovered only
$40,000,000, the attorney would be denied his or her fee if the runner-up
offered to sue the defendant for any amount above $30,000,000. Finally, under
yet another binding rule, the court would have to strike down any settlement
under which the class members' total recovery amount is below the stated
amount. The synergetic operation of these rules would eliminate the attorneys'
opportunity both for shirking and for striking collusive settlements with
corporate defendants. Consequently, these rules would turn the class counsel
into a faithful servant of the suing class.
II. OVERVIEW
This Article was inspired by a recent far-reaching development in the law
of class actions. Several federal courts have conducted auctions for appointing
lead class counsel,' a development culminating in the deployment of a
1. In re Oracle Sec. Litig., 131 F.R.D. 688 (N.D. Cal. 1990), 132 F.R.D. 538 (N.D. Cal. 1990), 136
F.R.D. 639 (N.D. Cal. 1991); In re Wells Fargo Sec. Litig., 157 F.R.D. 467 (N.D. Cal. 1995); In re
Amino Acid Lysine Antitrust Litig., 918 F. Supp. 1190 (N.D. Ill. 1996); In re California Micro Devices,
168 F.R.D. 257 (N.D. Cal. 1996); In re Cendant Corp. Litig., 182 F.R.D. 144 (D.N.J. 1998), rev'd, 264
F.3d 201 (3d. Cir. 2001); In re Network Assoc. Inc., 76 F. Supp. 2d 1017 (N.D. Cal. 1999); Sherleigh
Assocs. LLC v. Windmere-Durable Holdings, Inc., 184 F.R.D. 688 (S.D. Fla. 1999), 186 F.R.D. 669
(S.D. Fla. 1999); Wenderhold v. Cylink Corp., 188 F.R.D. 577 (N.D. Cal. 1999), 191 F.R.D. 600 (N.D.
Cal. 2000); In re Lucent Techs., Inc. Sec. Litig., 194 F.R.D. 137 (D.N.J. 2000); In re Bank One
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sophisticated bidding mechanism in the multimillion In re Auction Houses
Antitrust Litigation.2 This mechanism emulates a free-market environment in
which attorneys compete with each other for an opportunity to represent a
rational and self-seeking client by promising the client the highest amount of
recovery for the lowest possible fee.3 Subsequently, the best promise wins (but
a serious enough indication that the attorney who made that promise would be
unable to deliver on it might still disqualify the promise).4 As the court in
Auction Houses explains, this emulation of a free market is necessary in the
field of class actions because the client is composed of a large group of
dispersed and mostly unidentified claimants that cannot consolidate into a
5single owner.
Together with its precursors6 and progeny, 7 Auction Houses introduces a
remarkable shift both in the doctrine regulating class action lawyering and in
that doctrine's underlying motivation. 8 In deciding the preliminary issue of
appointing an attorney to represent the class, courts effectively broke with the
fiduciary tradition that deems an attorney's trust obligations towards her
clients9 to sufficiently inhibit the attorney's self-seeking temptations. The
courts have abandoned this idealized (if not naive) moralistic perception in
favor of a cold-blooded analysis of the class attorney's egoistic incentives.
They have conducted this analysis by explicitly resorting to economic theory.
In Auction Houses, the court's resort to that theory was particularly impressive
in its sweep and professionalism. 10 On the doctrinal level, these courts
uniformly held that an auction-based appointment of class counsel lies within
S'holders Class Actions, 96 F. Supp. 2d 780 (N.D. Il1. 2000). See also In re Synthroid Mktg. Litig., 201
F. Supp. 2d 861, 871-78 (2002) (using auction cases as a benchmark for determining class attorney
fees).
2. In re Auction Houses Antitrust Litig., 197 F.R.D. 71 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (Kaplan, J.).
3. Id. at 82.
4. Id. at 72-73, 84-85.
5. Id. at 78.
6. See cases cited supra note 1.
7. See, e.g., In re Quintus Sec. Litig., 148 F. Supp. 2d 967 (N.D. Cal. 2001); In re Comdisco Sec.
Litig., 141 F. Supp. 2d 951 (N.D. Il. 2001).
8. See also William B. Rubenstein, A Transactional Model ofAdudication, 89 GEO. L.J. 371, 426-
38 (2001) (underscoring the importance of lead class counsel auctions as part of the general shift
towards a transactional model of adjudication).
9. At their core, these obligations include diligence, loyalty and competence. See MODEL RULES OF
PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.3 cmt. 1 ("A lawyer must . . . act with commitment and dedication to the
interests of the client and with zeal in advocacy upon the client's behalf."); id R. 1.7 cmt. I ("Loyalty
[is an] essential element[] in the lawyer's relationship to a client."); id R. 1.1 ("Competent
representation requires the legal knowledge, skill, thoroughness and preparation reasonably necessary
for the representation."). See also Nancy J. Moore, Who Should Regulate Class Action Lawyers?, U. ILL.
L. REV. (forthcoming 2003) (arguing for adjustments in the professional ethics standards that would
accommodate the peculiarities of class action litigation).
10. In devising the auction, Judge Kaplan commissioned amicus curiae briefs from academic
experts and conducted an explicit economic analysis of class attorneys' incentives. See Auction Houses,
197 F.R.D. at 74, 75-85.
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their discretionary powers under both Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23-
which controls class actions in general-and the Private Securities Litigation
Reform Act of 1995 (PSLRA)1 that introduced some special arrangements for
class actions filed in connection with securities. Under these rulings, the court's
discretion to appoint the class attorney by an auction that best serves the
interests of the suing class overrides the traditional "first-to-file" principle
12
and may even trump the PSLRA's "largest investor" approach. 13 Underlying
this shift is the courts' aspiration to place class attorneys under egoistic
incentives that align with the interests of the attorneys' clients. Attorneys
operating under such incentives would ardently maximize their private profits
by zealously promoting their clients' interests. They would no longer be willing
to enter into collusive settlements with corporate defendants or otherwise
misuse their control over class actions by making profits at their clients'
expense. If such incentives could be devised, the well-being of individuals
would become better protected from abuses by corporate power.14
This shift has not gone unchallenged. Academic writers have generally
11. See Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 21D, 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4 (2003); Securities Act of 1933
§ 27, 15 U.S.C. § 77z-1 (2003). These amendments were introduced by the Private Securities Litigation
Reform Act (PSLRA), Pub. L. No. 104-67, § l(a), 109 Stat. 737 (1995). The courts' holdings to which
we refer in the text appear in cases cited, see supra notes 1-2. In particular, see In re Lucent Techs., Inc.,
Sec. Litig., 194 F.R.D. 137, 155-57 (D.N.J. 2000) (holding, in a class action governed by PSLRA, that
determination of lead counsel through a competitive bid process is necessary for protecting the interests
of the suing class); Auction Houses, 197 F.R.D. at 78-82 (holding the same under Rule 23 of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure). But see In re Cendant Corp. Litig., 264 F.3d 201, 220 (3d Cir. 2001) (holding
that, although there are situations under which PSLRA would permit a court to employ the auction
technique, generally, a court's decision to hold an auction to select lead counsel would be inconsistent
with PSLRA, a piece of legislation designed "to infuse lead plaintiffs with the responsibility (and
motivation) to drive a hard bargain with prospective lead counsel and to give deference to their
stewardship"); STEPHEN A. SALTZBURG ET AL., THIRD CIRCUIT TASK FORCE REPORT ON SELECTION OF
CLASS COUNSEL (2001), reprinted in 74 TEMP. L. REv. 689 (2001) [hereinafter TASK FORCE REPORT].
The Task Force found that auctions are inconsistent with the goal of the PSLRA, which is to assure that
the "most adequate" plaintiff will choose counsel and negotiate a reasonable fee. The PSLRA mandates
that class actions are to be client-driven, not court-driven. The Task Force further stated:
To the extent that an auction is even permissible under the PSLRA, it should only be
conducted if the lead plaintiff's choice of counsel, or process in choosing counsel ... is so
infirm as to rebut the presumption that the plaintiff is "most adequate" under the statute, and
then only if the alternative candidates for the "most adequate plaintiff' do not appear willing
or able to engage in a meaningful search for and negotiation with counsel.
Id. at 768.
12. See Auction Houses, 197 F.R.D. at 81-82 (acknowledging the benefit of the "first-to-file"
principle as "an incentive for attorneys to ferret out wrongs that may be difficult or impossible for
individual plaintiffs ever to identify," but holding that the class-member advantages that attorneys'
auctions produce outweigh that benefit).
13. See In re Lucent Techs., Inc., Sec. Litig., 194 F.R.D. 137, 155 (D.N.J. 2000) (holding that the
approval of lead counsel is not governed by the "largest investor" principle and by other guidelines that
control the lead plaintiff determination, and that the judgement of a lead plaintiff is not dispositive in the
appointment of lead counsel); In re Cendant Corp. Litig., 264 F.3d 201, 220 (3d Cir. 2001) (holding that
in an action governed by PSLRA, the court may conduct an auction for selecting class counsel only on
exceptional grounds).
14. We refer to well-being in its broadest possible sense, accommodating not only compensation
for the actual victims of corporate abuses, but also the deterrence benefits for the potential victims.
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commended its motivation but have voiced opposition to the selection of class
counsel through auctions.15 A special Third Circuit Task Force, convened by
former Chief Judge Edward R. Becker,16 has reached similar conclusions after
conducting a thorough investigation of the subject.1 7 Specifically, it concluded
that auction is a risky and complicated procedure for selecting class counsel, 18
and recommended its use only in a very restricted spectrum of cases. 19 Both the
Task Force and academic critics of the auctions have, however, focused on the
particular type of auctions that have so far been conducted by courts. This type
of auction turns the selected class counsel and her clients into co-owners of the
action in order to align the interests of the two. After examining a variety of
such auctions, both the Task Force and academic critics have concluded that
such auctions are unlikely to attain the desired alignment of interests.
20
The Attorney-as-Owner (or Ownership) paradigm, however, does not stand
alone as an ideological tool for designing class counsel auctions. This Article
offers a competitor: the Attorney-as-Servant (or Servantship) paradigm. Under
the Servantship paradigm, auctions for class counsel services need not facilitate
the optimal purchase of the attorney's loyalty to her clients by inviting
prospective class counsel to trade their services for a share in the clients'
action. Placing the attorney in the same boat with her clients is neither
necessary nor sufficient for securing the attorney's loyalty. The latter can be
secured by directly auctioning for loyalty. Under the Servantship paradigm,
prospective class counsel bid for a services-supply contract, not for property,
and the contract for which they bid structures their incentives in a way that
turns faithful representation of the suing class into the only profitable course of
15. See Lucian A. Bebchuk, The Questionable Case for Using Auctions to Select Lead Counsel, 80
WASH. U. L.Q. 889 (2002) (arguing that auction-based selection of class counsel will both underrate and
under-motivate high quality attorneys); Jill E. Fisch, Aggregation Complex Litigation at the Millenium:
Auctions and Other Developments in the Selection of Lead Counsel Under the PSLRA, 64 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 53 (2001) (expressing skepticism with regard to lead counsel auctions as a means for
eliminating the agency problem); Jill E. Fisch, Lawyers on the Auction Block: Evaluating the Selection
of Class Counsel by Auction, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 650 (2002) (arguing that auctions are poor tools for
identifying the best class counsel and for setting reasonable fee awards); TASK FORCE REPORT, supra
note 11, at 723 (certifying that both scholarship and academic witnesses who testified before the Task
Force "concluded that the asserted benefits of an auction are ... unproven and that whatever benefits
might exist are either outweighed by the risks and costs of an auction or are available in only a limited
range of cases").
16. TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 11, at 689.
17. Id. at 704-705, 723.
18. Id. at 704.
19. The task force noted:
The paradigmatic case in which an auction might be considered is one in which the
defendants' liability appears clear; the damages appear to be both very large and collectible;
and the lead plaintiff is not a sophisticated litigant that has already retained counsel of its
choice through a reasonable ann's-length process.
Id; see also id. at 741-45 (substantiating the recommendation above).
20. E.g.,id.at723-41.
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action. This new mechanism of class counsel selection is developed in the
pages ahead.
Corporate power poses a serious threat to the well-being of individuals. In
many instances, this power does not originate from the absence of substantive
rights protecting individuals, but rather from the lack of an efficient procedural
mechanism by which individuals can realize their rights. This observation was
one of the key factors that triggered the adoption of a sophisticated procedural
mechanism-class action-that facilitates compensation for wrongs committed
against large groups of individuals when each individual wrong is too small to
justify the costs of rectification through legal process. This mechanism is
justified in part by the need to prevent the injustice that would be caused by
denying a remedy to the victims of such wrongs. Efficiency concerns also
justify this mechanism as an incentive against wrongful conduct. If
corporations could escape from liability for such conduct, their incentives for
avoiding it would be substantially reduced. Consequently, corporations would
commit wrongs that yield them a profit and would not take the precautions
necessary for preventing the wrongs, even when those precautions were
efficient. Therefore, class action is a mechanism that promotes both individual
justice and efficiency.
The efficacious conduct of class actions, however, requires a major
concession on the part of the individuals wronged by corporate power. The
class action mechanism grants the power of prosecuting class actions to self-
appointed attorneys, and this deprives the victims of their power to control the
legal process, but the law does not reallocate this power for the benefit of
attorneys alone. Individual victims give up control over the legal process in
exchange for a realistic prospect that the wrongs that they suffered will be
remedied. The class counsel must secure this prospect in exchange for seizing
control over the lawsuit and for the corresponding fee-earning opportunity.
Indeed, this exchange is the very essence of the legally imposed transaction
between the victims and their self-appointed attorney.
However, as numerous commentators point out, this transaction suffers
from an inherent agency problem. As such, it does not promise the victims that
their damages will be properly rectified. The agency problem that arises in the
class action context is twofold. It involves both shirking and collusive behavior
on the part of class attorneys. An attorney controlling the action may decide to
earn her fee without investing the appropriate effort in securing the victims'
rights. Such an attorney may also explicitly or implicitly conspire with the
corporate wrongdoer to deprive the victims of their full remedy and to share the
proceeds among themselves. Such deprivation and sharing of the proceeds can
be effected through a collusive settlement between the wrongdoer and the class
attorney. As a consequence, the designated beneficiary of the class action-the
individual victim-would be deprived not merely of her procedural rights, but
Vol. 22:69, 2004
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also of her right to receive adequate compensation. A collusion between the
wrongdoer and the class attorney would also generate inefficiency. In exchange
for paying the class attorney a generous fee, the wrongdoer would reduce his
liability, if not effectively eliminate it. The resulting reduction of liability
would leave corporate wrongdoers under-deterred.
Academic literature offers a number of law reform proposals striving to
overcome the shirking problem and to break the unholy alliance between class
attorneys and corporate defendants. One of these proposals has even been
adopted by Congress. 2' Yet, as many commentators note, these proposals have
failed to resolve the problem. Individual victims of wrongs perpetrated by large
corporate wrongdoers can still be deprived of their rights by unscrupulous
attorneys who nominate themselves as class counsel. The Orwellian vision in
Animal Farm22 has not been fully realized in reality, but class actions are one
of the areas where this vision is not far from being realized.23
This Article pursues two central objectives. First, it aims at improving the
understanding of the class action agency problem. The Article attempts to
attain this objective by rigorously identifying the sources of that problem and
by categorizing the available solutions. Second, the Article aims at improving
the class action mechanism by offering its own solution to the problem. We
dedicate Parts III and IV of this Article to the former objective and Part V to
the latter. Part III divides the available solutions to the problem into two
24general types: Ownership and Servantship. The Ownership solutions aim at
aligning the class attorney's interests with those of the purported class by
granting the attorney an appropriate proprietary interest in the action. The
solutions surveyed in Part IV largely follow this path. These solutions,
however, suffer from serious drawbacks that we also discuss in Part IV. In that
Part of the Article, we pay special attention to the auctioning solutions that
federal courts increasingly adopt.
21. See Private Securities Litigation Reform Act (PSLRA), Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737
(1995) (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a to 78u-5.). The statute was guided by Elliott J. Weiss & John S.
Beckerman, Let the Money Do the Monitoring: How Institutional Investors Can Reduce Agency Costs in
Securities Class Actions, 104 YALE L.J. 2053 (1995) (suggesting abolishment of the "first come, first
serve" determination of lead plaintiffs in securities class litigation and conferral of this status on
institutional investors, who would appoint class counsel and effectively monitor them).
22. See GEORGE ORWELL, ANIMAL FARM 111-18 (1945) (providing a vivid literary depiction of the
social harm inflicted by self-appointed promoters of collective welfare).
23. Bentham labeled such phenomena "Judge & Co." in his critique of the fee-gathering system, in
which judges and attorneys form an exclusive alliance to pursue their own interests at the expense of
others. See, e.g., WILLIAM TWINING, THEORIES OF EVIDENCE: BENTHAM & WIGMORE 76-82 (1985).
24. Our invocation of these two paradigms resonates with Professor Steven Shavell's general
treatment of the principal-agent relationship. Cf Steven Shavell, Risk Sharing and Incentives in the
Principal and Agent Relationship, 10 BELL J. ECON. 55 (1979) (arguing that optimal allocation of
enterprise risks between the principal and the agent would provide the agent with both proprietary
interest and effort-based fee).
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The Servantship solutions attempt to resolve the class action agency
problem by limiting the power of class attorneys and by monitoring their
performance. The prevalent legal doctrine provides one such solution: it
attempts to limit the class attorneys' power and to monitor their performance
through judicial control over class action settlements and class-attorney fees.
However, this solution is generally perceived as inadequate, and Part IV lends
further support to this evaluation.
25
Part V presents our solution to the problem at hand. Similar to the still
prevalent doctrinal solution of that problem, our solution falls under the
Servantship paradigm. However, unlike the prevalent doctrine, we do not base
26
our solution on judicial monitoring of settlements and fees. Our solution
offers to create a competitive environment in which the class attorney's
litigation plan and performance will be closely monitored by other attorneys
eager to gain control over the class action, as well as by the defendant. We
offer to create this environment by adopting a fairly simple system of rewards
and punishments. This system consists of three rigorously defined principles:
auction, fee forfeiture, and a ban on inadequate settlements. The auction
principle creates competition among prospective class attorneys by granting
control over the action to the highest bidder, namely, the attorney willing to sue
the defendant for the largest amount of money.27 This stated amount would
bind the attorney only, so the court would be free to award the class members
any amount it deems adequate. The action's stated amount would thus function
as a settlement floor for class attorneys and defendants, not as a verdict-ceiling
for judges and juries; and, whenever appropriate, jurors should be instructed
25. Professor John Coffee offered yet another solution that follows the Servantship paradigm. See
John C. Coffee, Jr., Class Action Accountability: Reconciling Exit, Voice, and Loyalty in Representative
Litigation, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 370 (2000). This solution facilitates the class members' "voice" and
"exit" in order to secure their loyal representation by the class attorney. We discuss this solution in Part
IV. Another solution, which we do not discuss, belongs to Alon Klement, Who Should Guard the
Guardians? A New Approach for Monitoring Class Action Lawyers, 21 REV. LITIG. 25 (2002), who
offers a system of private monitoring conducted by individuals and organizations-not necessarily class
members-who would compete and pay for obtaining the monitoring position and would receive a share
of the class recovery in return. This solution should be assessed by its costs, for it introduces an
additional intermediary between the class members and their dues. Engaging a faithful and effective
watchdog in monitoring the class counsel performance would require the suing class to pay the
watchdog substantial remuneration.
26. Nor do we ground it on the hostile takeover possibility, for which see Coffee, supra note 25, at
422. Similar to Professor Coffee, we favor the creation of competitive environment for class attorneys.
Unlike him, however, we believe that competition among prospective class attorneys should take place
only before filing of the action. Attorneys participating in that competition must receive an assurance
that there will be no second round; subject to extreme cases, such as death or disbarment, an attorney
who prevails in that competition ought to be immune from further attempts to replace her by another
attorney. See infra notes 113-121 and accompanying text.
27. We are generally skeptical with respect to non-monetary remedies in class actions. Many such
remedies are easily convertible into the conjurer's decoy that functions as a cover for a sleight of two
collusive hands: that of the class counsel and that of the corporate defendant. Yet, there are cases in
which such remedies are appropriate, and our model would apply to such cases by translating the non-
monetary relief into money.
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about it in explicit terms. In order to guarantee that auction bidders do not
artificially inflate their bids, we design two supplementary principles. The first
principle is fee forfeiture: an attorney who sues for an unreasonably
exaggerated amount will be denied her fee. Our model provides a rigorous
definition for an unreasonably exaggerated amount. This definition is based
upon comparison between the actual compensation awarded by the court and
the auction offers filed by other attorneys. The second principle bans
inadequate settlements: the court will not approve a settlement under which the
plaintiffs' total recovery amount is below the stated amount. Hence, defendants
sued for exaggerated sums would have no incentives to settle. Nor would they
be able to seduce class attorneys by offering them "sweetheart" settlement
deals. Attorneys eager to save their time, efforts and expenses would not sue
for exaggerated amounts, knowing that they would lose their settlement
opportunities and thus inevitably expend the full amount of their opportunity
costs. The combined operation of these principles would eliminate the
attorneys' opportunity for both shirking and collusive settlements.
Consequently, these principles would turn the class counsel into a faithful
servant of the suing class.
Our model also guarantees that class attorneys have an incentive to file a
class action for a sum that reflects the attorneys' genuine evaluation of the
action's expected value. 28 This sum equals the compensation that the court
would award if the case were to be resolved in a trial, multiplied by the
claimants' probability of winning the case. Furthermore, our proposal
guarantees that, if the attorney is right in her evaluation of the action's expected
value, the defendant would rationally settle the case for this amount in order to
avoid the costs of a lengthy and cumbersome trial. Our proposal also offers a
solution for exceptional cases in which the class attorney discovers that her
evaluation of the action's expected value was too high.
By operating in this way, our model guarantees both a loyal and
professionally adequate representation of class members. The model attains this
objective through the elimination of false signaling on the part of prospective
class counsel, which is yet another important feature of the model. The model
precludes such false signaling by screening out the bids tendered by potentially
disloyal and incompetent attorneys. Indeed, there is only one type of attorney
capable of winning our auction: an attorney who conscientiously estimates the
class members' expected recovery, offers them a competitive fee and pledges
her earnings from the case as a security for her undertaking to provide the class
members both a loyal and competent representation. All other attorneys would
28. The attorneys' determination of this sum would also involve an estimate of the size of the pool
(net of opt-outs) of similarly-situated classable claims.
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either be defeated in the auction or forfeit their earnings from the case. To
operate properly, this model needs to be supplemented by an appropriate
mechanism for pre-auction discovery. Without such a mechanism, prospective
class counsel would hardly be able to estimate the expected return of the action.
Many attorneys would consequently decline to search for and prosecute
violations, and those who would still be willing to do so would base their
auction offers on a fair amount of guesswork. Due to this informational
handicap, the bidding attorneys would also account for the "winner's curse"
problem, that is, for a possibility that the winning bid overestimates the fee-
earning potential of the action. To offset the unknown risk, the attorneys would
consequently tend to reduce the stated value of the action and to increase their
fee percentage.
A more general operation of the attorney services market would exacerbate
this tendency. Absence of an appropriate pre-auction discovery mechanism
would dissuade some able attorneys from placing a bid. The number of bidders
would consequently decrease, thereby weakening the forces of the envisioned
competitive environment. The remaining bidders would therefore be able to
win the auction by placing lower bids, which would work to the detriment of
both the class (as far as the compensatory objective of the law is concerned)
and society at large (to the extent that the law aims at deterring corporate
wrongdoers).29 Part VI therefore offers the required discovery mechanism, a
procedure that would be conducted by a special master for a secured fee. The
appointment of a special master for activating that mechanism is possible under
Rule 53 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
30
In Part VII, we address a special variant of the class action agency problem:
intraclass conflicts. We do so by describing the intraclass conflict problem and
by identifying its possible solution under our model. Part VIII summarizes this
29. The proposed mechanism for pre-auction discovery would be socially beneficial for an
additional reason: it would eliminate duplicate efforts and costs that discovery undertaken by individual
bidders would otherwise incur.
30. See FED. R. Civ. P. 53(a) ("The court in which any action is pending may appoint a special
master therein. As used in these rules, the word 'master' includes a referee, an auditor, an examiner, and
an assessor. The compensation to be allowed to a master shall be fixed by the court, and shall be
charged upon such of the parties or paid out of any fund or subject matter of the action, which is in the
custody and control of the court as the court may direct"); FED. R. Civ. P. 53(c) ("The order of reference
to the master may specify or limit the master's powers and may direct the master to report only upon
particular issues or to do or perform particular acts or to receive and report evidence only and may fix
the time and place for beginning and closing the hearings and for the filing of the master's report.
Subject to the specifications and limitations stated in the order, the master has and shall exercise the
power to regulate all proceedings in every hearing before the master and to do all acts and take all
measures necessary or proper for the efficient performance of the master's duties under the order. The
master may require the production before the master of evidence upon all matters embraced in the
reference, including the production of all books, papers, vouchers, documents, and writings applicable
thereto. The master may rule upon the admissibility of evidence unless otherwise directed by the order
of reference and has the authority to put witnesses on oath and may examine them and may call the
parties to the action and examine them upon oath.").
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Article's principal conclusions.
III. THE CLASS ACTION AGENCY PROBLEM
A. The Nature of the Problem
Class action is a mechanism that turns a dispersion of non-assets into an
asset by consolidating a large number of economically senseless lawsuits into a
single lawsuit that makes economic sense. When a lawsuit owner complains
that his telephone company overcharged him by one dollar, he is well-advised
not to seek legal remedies: de minimis non curat lex. Even when a lawsuit is
not de minimis, a rational claimant would not initiate it if its expected return is
exceeded by litigation expenses. From an economic viewpoint, such lawsuits
also ought not to be initiated because their benefits (compensation and
deterrence) are outweighed by costs. However, when such lawsuits are
numerous, and when they complain that some wrong was recurrently
perpetrated by a single defendant or by a group of defendants, they ought to be
prosecuted. If such numerous lawsuits are not carried out, the deterrence and
the compensation objectives of the law would be undermined quite severely.
Ideally, owners of such lawsuits should unite them into one and then prosecute
it with full vigor and with optimized litigation expenses. In reality, however,
such a unification is unfeasible: ordinarily, the well-known transaction cost and
collective action problems foil the required unification. The law therefore
allows an attorney (via a nominal client) to take such lawsuits into her hands, to
consolidate them into a single lawsuit (a common fund), and to prosecute it on
behalf of the silent dispersion of plaintiffs. Generally, any of the plaintiffs
taken aboard as a class member may disembark at will by opting his lawsuit
out.32 To make sure that class members actually decide whether to remain in
the class or opt out, the court will require the class attorney to properly
publicize the proceedings. 33 Average class members, however, would scarcely,
if ever, opt out: because their individual lawsuits are economically untenable,
there is no downside for them in sticking to the class (unless a more attractive
class action becomes available).34
The class attorney consequently appropriates full (although judicially
monitored) control over the multitude of dispersed lawsuits. In exchange, she
31. Aggregation and consolidation of similar claims have additional benefits that are recognized by
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Among those benefits are prevention of inconsistent adjudications,
elimination of an adverse impact of individual verdicts upon non-parties and a simple expediency. See
FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(1), (b)(3).
32. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3), (c)(2)-(3).
33. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(2).
34. See Coffee, supra note 25, at 423-4.
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affords the lawsuit owners the probability of generating gain through court
victory, indexed here as probability P. The class attorney appropriates control
over the lawsuits not for its own sake: she intends to earn a fee contingent upon
the amount of money (or its equivalent) recovered for the class (either through
court victory or by a settlement). Determination of that fee lies within the
discretion of the court. The attorney's fee would often be a fixed percentage (f)
of the recovered amount (R), so it would equalfR. Alternatively (and still more
commonly, as far as American class litigation is concerned), the attorney would
recover her usual hourly fee and expenditures-that is, the attorney's
opportunity costs-to which the court will add an appropriate risk-increment.
35
The court will determine this increment by accounting for the risk of losing the
36
case that the attorney assumed. The court thus will use, explicitly or
implicitly, an appropriate risk-multiplier. 37 Under this system, widely known as
the "lodestar" formula, 38 the attorney will obtain this increased compensation
because she used her opportunity costs as a venture capital investment in her
clients' asset. For the sake of convenience, this Article assumes that the
percentage system is being used, sofand (1 -J) will respectively represent the
attorney's and the clients' fractional shares in the action. The validity of our
model, however, does not depend on this simplifying assumption.
To complete the picture, let the class attorney's opportunity costs
(including all litigation expenses) 39 be indexed by C; for the sake of simplicity,
let C also denote the defendant's attorney fees and other litigation expenses,
even though in practice, defending against a class action is typically more
expensive than prosecuting it;40 and let the attorney's and the defendant's
settlement costs be ignored (in class actions, settlement costs are much lower
than the costs of litigation; in any event, C may represent any positive
difference between litigation and settlement costs).
41
Accordingly, the expected gain for the class members equals PR(1 -J); the
expected gain for the class attorney amounts tofPR - C; and the expected loss
for the defendant is PR + C. If we assume that these actors are risk-neutral and
35. See TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 11, at 706-7.
36. Id. at 706.
37. Id.
38. See In re Auction Houses Antitrust Litig., 197 F.R.D. 71, 76-77 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (describing
the "lodestar" formula and analyzing its virtues and vices).
39. We make here a both customary and realistic assumption that courts do not reimburse class
attorneys for their expenses. See, e.g., Auction Houses, 197 F.R.D. at 74 (ruling that "the attorney's fee
would be inclusive of all costs, disbursements and other charges incurred in connection with the
litigation").
40. See Developments in the Law-The Paths of Civil Litigation, 113 HARV. L. REV. 1827, 1833
(2000) (observing that defendants generally spend more than plaintiffs on mass litigation and explaining
this phenomenon by the across-the-board implications of defendants' individual defeats and victories).
41. This Article adopts as its baseline the American no-fee rule, under which each party bears its
own litigation costs. See Alyeska Pipeline Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240 (1975) (holding that a
court may not award attorneys' fees to a prevailing party unless expressly authorized by statute).
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equally informed about the case, then each of those sums would represent,
respectively, the settlement position of the class members, the class attorney
and the defendant. The difference between the defendant's and the class
members' settlement positions would determine the settlement range, that is,
the surplus that these parties will divide among themselves in the event of a
settlement. As far as the class members and the defendant are concerned, if this
difference yields a positive amount, the case would rationally be settled out of
court; if not, then the case would go to trial. The difference between the
defendant's and the class attorney's settlement positions would, respectively,
determine the settlement range from these actors' point of view. As far as the
interests of the class attorney and the defendant are concerned, if the difference
between their settlement positions yields a positive amount, they would
rationally settle the case out of court; if not, then the case would go to trial.
Consequently, two settlement ranges, rather than one, ought to be considered in
analyzing the class action agency problem.42 The first is the settlement range as
between the class members and the defendant, which equals
PR + C - PR(1 -J). The second is the settlement range as between the class
attorney and the defendant, which equals PR + C - (fPR - C), that is,
PR(1 -J) + 2C.
Here lies the class action agency problem. The action is controlled by the
class attorney, so its controlling settlement range-which can be divided by the
class attorney and the defendant, assuming that the two are both legally and
morally unconstrained-amounts to PR(1 - J) + 2C. In other words, the
controlling settlement range in a class action encompasses the expected gain
for the class members and the sum of the class attorney's and the defendant's
litigation costs. This range is very large, which makes settlement very likely.
The settlement range is made large by the asymmetry of the stakes: the amount
expected to be lost by the defendant is much greater than the amount that the
class attorney expects to gain. If the attorney prosecuted her own action, its
settlement value for her would be PR - C (the expected gain minus costs). This
value would be similar to that of a class action for the members of the suing
class, if they were to control the prosecution of their action (with C being equal
to their legal representation costs and other expenses). The defendant's
settlement value would accordingly be PR + C. In such an action, the
settlement range would therefore equal PR + C - (PR - C), that is, 2C, which is
known to be the normal settlement condition.4 3 The difference between the
42. This analysis draws on Geoffrey P. Miller, Some Agency Problems in Settlement, 16 J. LEGAL
STUD. 189 (1987) (identifying and analyzing agency costs in attorney-controlled lawsuits).
43. See Robert D. Cooter & Daniel L. Rubinfeld, Economic Analysis of Legal Disputes and Their
Resolution, 27 J. ECON. LIT. 1067, 1075 (1989) (identifying the normal conditions for efficient
settlements, the cooperative value of such settlements, and the factors impeding settlements).
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settlement ranges in attorney-controlled and client-controlled lawsuits would
thus equal PR(1 -j) + 2C - 2C, that is, PR(1 -J). This difference is embedded
in the class members' expected gain. The class attorney may therefore sacrifice
a fraction of the class members' expected gain-thereby reducing both her
litigation effort and the defendant's liability-in order to strike a settlement
bargain favorable to herself. The outcome of such a bargain would be low
recovery for the class members and high fee for the class attorney. The
availability of such bargains means that class attorneys have an ample
opportunity for shirking and for collusive behavior.
For obvious reasons, the defendant would only be pleased to strike a
collusive bargain with the class attorney: such a bargain would eliminate the
immediate threat of the lawsuit; in appropriate cases, it would also provide the
defendant with the desired res judicata protection from future lawsuits. Such a
bargain is likely to be initiated at one of the earlier stages of the proceeding, so
that both the defendant and the class attorney could save a greater fraction of
their litigation expenditures. In other words, the defendant and the class
attorney may generate and divide between themselves a settlement surplus at
the class members' expense. Theoretically-if the court certifying the
settlement is willfully blind-the defendant may gain the whole settlement
range after paying the attorney her expected fee amount. Realistically, the
defendant' may "only" gain a large portion of the settlement range by
supplementing the attorney's high fee with flowers, an apology and a bundle of
coupons for the class members. When a coupon settlement appears
suspicious,44 the defendant may still settle the action by paying the class
members a low amount of compensation. The low amount of class-member
compensation can be convoluted in a variety of ways. Typically, this can be
done by devising complex (or highly refined) settlement criteria for individual
recoveries. For example, in cases where proof of causation is either unavailable
or prohibitively expensive, a settlement agreement may provide that a
liquidated low amount of compensation will be paid to each individual member
of the class who failed to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that his
actual damage resulted from the defendant's wrongdoing. The defendant's
wrongdoing, if admitted in the settlement agreement, may also be defined in a
way that would frustrate the possibility of establishing the required causation.
Such settlement schemes would be praised by experts and other witnesses, who
would testify in meticulously orchestrated settlement hearings when they are
virtually unopposed. Any opposition to a proposed settlement is likely to be
44. See generally Geoffrey P. Miller & Lori S. Singer, Nonpecuniary Class Action Settlements,
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Autumn 1997, at 97 (analyzing class action settlements involving coupons,
securities, outside monitoring, reverter funds and fluid recoveries); Note, In-Kind Class Action
Settlements, 109 HARV. L. REV. 810 (1996) (analyzing the vices and the virtues of coupon settlements of
class actions).
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muted by the settlement's proponents, who would utilize for that purpose their
superior knowledge of the facts.4 5 The judicial incentive to clear dockets would
also (perhaps crucially) contribute to the approval of the proposed settlement.4 6
Consequently, courts may be persuaded to approve class action settlements that
benefit the defendants and the class attorneys at the expense of the individual
members of the suing class.
There is, therefore, a serious risk of collusion between the class attorney
and the defendant. The class attorney can extract her expected gain, and often
even more than that sum, without zealously prosecuting the case. The
defendant, in turn, can cheaply get rid of the lawsuit and buy himself the
desired res judicata protection. This anticipated collusion would almost always
be implicit rather than explicit: consonantly with the positive law, we assume
throughout this Article that explicitly collusive settlements between class
attorneys and defendants are punishable both criminally and by disbarment,
and are also actionable in contract and tort. At some risk of being unrealistic,
we also assume that these sanctions effectively deter class attorneys and
defendants from entering into such settlements.4 7
A simple analysis of the incentives that parties to such settlements would
develop makes our assumption even more reliable. An explicitly collusive
settlement is generally unstable. To avoid the punishment and other sanctions
that the law imposes in connection with such a settlement, its insider
information must be kept secret by the contracting parties. This dependence on
secrecy generates the prospect of holdouts and extortion: each party to an
explicitly collusive settlement-the class attorney, on the one side, and the
defendant, on the other side-would anticipate mutual extortions. Each of those
45. Another tactic that the defendant and the class attorney may utilize to make their settlement
look appealing is to artificially inflate the size of the class (which would often be sufficiently uncertain)
together with the parallel amount of class member recovery. This part of the settlement would guarantee
a high fee for the class attorney. Supplementing it with complex criteria for individual recoveries would
also practically exempt the defendant from making the actual payments to most of the claimants.
46. See DEBORAH R. HENSLER ET AL., RAND INSTITUTE FOR CIVIL JUSTICE, EXECUTIVE SUMMARY,
CLASS ACTION DILEMMAS: PURSUING PUBLIC GOALS FOR PRIVATE GAIN 10 (1999) (demonstrating by
data analysis that judges "may not have the resources or inclination to scrutinize settlements for self-
dealing and collusion among attorneys"). See also John C. Coffee, Jr., Class Wars: The Dilemma of the
Mass Tort Class Action, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 1343, 1363-64 (1995) (pointing to judges' motivation to
clear dockets by approving mass tort settlements).
47. Defendants entering into such settlements will also risk removal of the res judicata protection.
See United States v. Throckmorton, 98 U.S. 61, 65-66 (1878) (holding that extrinsic fraud that denies a
party an opportunity to present his case invalidates res judicata); Long v. Shorebank Dev. Corp. 182
F.3d 548, 561 (7th Cir. 1999) (invalidating res judicata upon finding an extrinsic fraud, a situation
"where 'the unsuccessful party was prevented from fully exhibiting his case ... as by keeping him away
from court"' (citing Falcon v. Falkner, 567 N.E.2d 686, 694-95 (Ill. App. Ct. 1991) (internal quotation
marks omitted))); E. & J. Gallo Winery v. Gallo Cattle Company, 955 F.2d 1327, 1335 (9th Cir. 1992)
(noting that extrinsic fraud invalidating res judicata "essentially entails preventing a party 'from
presenting all of his case to the court,' as opposed to defrauding the party with respect to the substantive
rights being adjudicated at a proceeding" (citing Sanders v. Sutton, 710 P.2d 252, 235 (Cal. 1985))).
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parties would have an ample opportunity to extort additional benefits from the
other party in return for not disclosing the settlement. Because losses expected
from such holdouts would usually be asymmetric (the defendant would risk a
large amount of money; the attorney would risk disbarment; with both parties
facing criminal sanctions that are roughly identical), and because society would
usually remunerate such holdouts by a reduction (or a complete removal) of the
exiting conspirator's liability-the incentive to hold out from an explicitly
collusive settlement would be rather substantial. This incentive significantly
dilutes the prospect of generating any profit from such a collusion. Both
corporate defendants and class counsel would therefore predominantly choose
an implicitly collusive settlement.48
B. The Conflict-of-Interests Differential
From the class attorney's perspective, there are, therefore, two principal
ways of implicitly colluding with the defendant. One way of doing so is to
strike an early settlement that yields the attorney her expected fee and saves a
large fraction of her work and other undertaken investments in the case. The
attorney would thus cash her share in the action without paying for it with the
opportunity costs, in exchange for which she acquired that share. The other
way of doing so is to strike a settlement that would leave the attorney an even
higher fee. The attorney would thus enlarge her share in the action by reducing
her clients' share, which, of course, would be done without her clients'
knowledge and consent. From the attorney's viewpoint, the second type of
collusion would usually be more profitable, but it would also be riskier than the
first, as it could not easily go undetected at the settlement hearing.49
48. We thank Guy Halfteck for bringing this point to our attention.
49. The class action agency problem is instructively comparable with a similar problem that arises
in corporate settings due to the separation between the stockholders, who own a corporation, and the
directors who exercise control over its affairs. First, corporate directors are appointed by the
corporation's principal stockholders. The directors' selection process is consequently influenced by their
reputation for integrity and professional skills. This is not the case with self-appointed class attorneys,
who seize control over class actions without being subjected to a selection process by their clients.
Courts are also unlikely to conduct aggressive screening procedures for selecting class attorneys. Any
such initiative would goad undesirable clashes between the bench and the bar. Besides, judges would
rarely have an objective reason for disqualifying an attorney as a class representative. They could do so
only in highly exceptional cases. Self-interested defendants would not file motions to dismiss class
attorneys on the grounds of inadequacy: the defendant can only benefit from poor representation of the
suing class. See Geoffrey P. Miller, Class Actions, in 1 THE NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF
ECONOMICS AND THE LAW 257, 257-60 (Peter Newman ed., 1998).
Second, corporate directors are subjected to fiduciary and due diligence duties that are generally
more demanding than those that apply to litigation attorneys. Litigation is a risky venture and attorneys
who conduct it are not underwriters of its successful resolution. A class attorney who strikes a
settlement subsequently approved by the court would be practically immune from being successfully
sued by her clients. Her chances of being found liable in a malpractice lawsuit would depend on the
existence of evidence that establishes her collusion with the defendant. For obvious reasons, such
evidence would scarcely be available. Class attorneys therefore act without being subjected to serious
constraints. Indeed, those who believe that corporate directors are insufficiently constrained in dealing
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Both types of collusion exploit the conflict-of-interests differential. In our
analysis, this notion represents the difference between the action's expected
value for the suing class and the amount of recovery that the class counsel
would deliver to her clients after settling the case with the defendant. The class
attorney and the defendant accomplish their exploitation of the conflict-of-
interests differential by a settlement agreement that divides this differential
between the two. The two types of collusion that we have identified above
differ from each other by the size of the differential: the first type exploits the
minimum differential amount that can be found in every class action; in the
second type, the degree of opportunism is contingent upon circumstances, so
the sky is the limit. As Part V demonstrates, our model eliminates both types of
collusion. At the present stage, however, we focus only on the first type, which
exploits the conflict-of-interests differential at its minimum. We now examine
cases in which the class attomey's "only" wrong is her failure to deliver the
goods which she undertook to deliver in exchange for her share in the action.
Unlike blatant embezzlement from the client, such wrongs are more likely to
go undetected. They are therefore more tempting from both the class counsel's
and the defendant's perspectives.
Professor Geoffrey Miller demonstrated that if a plaintiffs attorney works
on a contingent-fee basis, and her agreement with the plaintiff grants her a
unilateral power to strike a settlement with the defendant, the attorney would
be able to elicit gains at the client's expense.50 Such an attorney would settle
the case (that is, sell it to the defendant) for any amount (S) that would leave
her with a fee equal to (or greater than) fPR - C (as previously in this Article, C
denotes the attomey's opportunity costs). When JS _ JPR - C, the attorney
would settle the case for any S equal to (or greater than) PR - C/f The client's
share in that amount would equal (1 -])(PR - C/), which is less than the case's
expected value for the client, already indexed as PR(1 - J). The difference
between the client's expected value of the case and the amount that the client
would recover through a settlement procured by her self-seeking attorney
would thus equal C(1 -fil/f This difference represents the minimum conflict-
of-interests differential.5
with corporate assets would find the class attorneys' position truly alarming. Cf John C. Coffee, Jr.,
Understanding the Plaintiff's Attorney: The Implications of Economic Theory for Private Enforcement
of Law Through Class and Derivative Actions, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 669 (1986) (demonstrating that class
attorneys are poorly monitored and suggesting ways of tightening their monitoring); Coffee, supra note
25 (arguing that analogizing the mechanisms for class attorneys' monitoring to those that apply to
corporate directors would motivate class attorneys to serve their clients with greater loyalty).
50. See Miller, supra note 42, at 198-202.
51. Throughout this Article, we assume, for the sake of convenience, that the relevant actors are
risk-neutral. Other assumptions with respect to the possible attitudes toward risk would introduce
unnecessary complications without affecting the substance of our arguments. See also infra note 139
and accompanying text (arguing that possible risk-aversion among prospective class attorneys is not a
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To have a concrete example and visualize the injustice to the client,
consider a lawsuit that has an expected value of $1,000,000 (say, a lawsuit that
has a 60% chance of winning approximately $1,700,000). Further assume that
the contingent fee of the claimant's attorney is 30% and that the attorney's
anticipated investment in litigating the case (the opportunity cost) equals
$150,000. Under these conditions, the client can rightfully expect to recover
from the case $700,000 (70% of $1,000,000). The attorney's rightful gain is
$150,000 (30% of $1,000,000, minus the attorney's $150,000 litigation
investment). Yet, since it is the attorney-not the client-who makes
settlement decisions, the attorney would readily accept a $500,000 settlement
offer coming from the defendant, without litigating the case. The defendant
would extend this offer to the attorney on the basis of the PR - C/f formula
($1,000,000 - $150,000/30% = $500,000). Following the acceptance of this
offer, the client would recover $350,000 (70% of $500,000), while the attorney
would gain the amount originally craved ($150,000-a sum amounting to 30%
of $500,000) without making the promised investment into the case. If made as
promised, this investment could have generated an additional amount of
$350,000 that would go to the client (70% of the $500,000 shortfall between
the lawsuit's expected value-$1,000,000-and the settlement amount of
$500,000). The minimum conflict-of-interests differential (C(1 -i)/) identifies
this deprivation ($150,000 x 70% + 30% = $350,000).
In the present example, the claimant's attorney and the defendant split this
differential among themselves in the following way. The attorney embezzles
the client's $700,000 asset (a 70% share in a $1,000,000 case) by acquiring his
or her 30% share in the case for free. Instead of expending a $150,000 effort on
prosecuting the case zealously-and thereby rightfully gaining a $300,000
fee-the attorney undersells the $1,000,000 asset for $500,000. The attorney's
share in the embezzlement of the client's asset therefore equals $150,000, with
$200,000 being the defendant's embezzlement gain. If the client were not
defrauded, the defendant would have had to purchase the client's 70% share in
the asset for $700,000, in addition to purchasing the attorney's 30% share for
$300,000 (the defendant's total gain from the collusive settlement thus amounts
to $500,000, plus the saving of its own litigation expenses). The attorney
undersells the claimant's case for a sum that also reduces his or her share from
$300,000 to $150,000. However, this reduction has no impact on the attorney's
welfare because the attorney would only have been able to sell his or her share
for $300,000 if he or she had expended a litigation effort worth $150,000. To
reiterate: instead of purchasing a $300,000 share in a $1,000,000 asset for
$150,000, the attorney takes over for free a $150,000 share in the same asset by
seizing the asset and by underselling it to the defendant for $500,000. This
factor that should affect formulation of class action rules).
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collusive transaction leaves the client, who owns the asset, with a $350,000,
rather than $500,000, loss because the asset can only be sold through
consumption of legal services that downsize it by 30% (from $1,000,000 to
$700,000). Consequently, the $500,000 discount that the claimant's attorney
and the defendant collusively put on the asset's actual price takes away from
the claimant $350,000 ($500,000 x 70%).
The minimum conflict-of-interests differential equals the attorney's
promised investment in the litigation (that is, her opportunity costs denoted by
C) multiplied by the ratio of the client's and the attorney's fractional shares in
the action (denoted, respectively, as 1 - f and J). Ideally, the conflict-of-
interests differential must be brought down to zero, which would mean that
there is no conflict of interests. This, indeed, is one of the primary objectives of
the various rules that regulate the delivery of legal services. In reality, however,
and especially in class actions, this objective is notoriously difficult to attain. In
a class action controlled by the plaintiffs' attorney, the minimum conflict-of-
interests differential-C( - J)/f-is always a positive amount. This amount
provides an obvious incentive for the class attorney to embezzle from her
clients with the help of the defendant, who would benefit from the
embezzlement as its major beneficiary. The two become able to strike a
collusive settlement to their mutual benefit at the class members' expense. The
attorney's minimum gain from such a settlement would equal her clients'
deprivation of the attorney's promised investment in the case, in exchange for
which the attorney had acquired her share in the action. The defendant's gain
from the settlement would equal the sum of his saved litigation costs and the
difference between the expected and the actual settlement amounts. The class
members' minimum loss would equal the minimum conflict-of-interests
differential, as defined above. If the attorney alone owned the action, then f
would equal 1, so the conflict-of-interests differential would equal zero. This
restates the simple truth that if the attorney represented her interest alone, she
would not agree to settle the case for less than its full expected value (net of
litigation costs). In the same vein, when the attorney's opportunity costs (C)
are zero, the conflict-of-interests differential would also amount to zero.
This point is crucial for understanding our model, and we return to it later.
At the present stage, this point merits preliminary clarification. The existing
solutions to the class action agency problem attempt to align the class
attorney's incentives with her clients' interests. They consequently offer
different incentive adjustments that induce the attorney to manage the case as
she would manage it if she herself owned the action. Almost invariably, courts
and commentators seek to attain this alignment through emulation of the f= 1
condition, which represents the Ownership paradigm. Fulfillment of this
condition through purchase of the entire class action by the class attorney
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realizes this approach to its full extent.52
Our approach is different: it offers a similarly oriented incentive adjustment
by forcing the class attorney to remove her opportunity costs as a factor that
influences her decisions concerning the initiation and management of the
action. Under our model, by assuming the class counsel's role, an attorney
irrevocably commits her professional efforts and expenses (denoted by C) to
the promotion of her clients benefit. Formally, the C = 0 condition helps to
attain the required alignment between the interests of the class attorney and
those of her clients. This crucial condition represents the Servantship paradigm.
Indeed, this condition is one of the key features of our model.
This condition, however, is only one component of that model: when it
stands alone, it does not guarantee adequate representation of the suing class.
Specifically, this condition can only eliminate the minimum conflict-of-
interests differential: large-scale embezzlements of the suing class call for
additional protective measures. The C = 0 condition also holds no assurance
that the class attorney will properly assess the settlement value of the action.
Thef= 1 condition, which the Ownership models attempt to emulate, also fails
to provide such an assurance. Apart from being a rather unrealistic scenario,
fulfillment of this condition only guarantees faithful representation of the suing
class. It does not guarantee the proper assessment of the lawsuit's settlement
value by the class attorney. The C = 0 condition does not, however, represent
our entire model. This condition can provide all the assurances that class
members require only by combining with other conditions of the model. Part V
expounds the model's conditions together with the technique by which they can
be created.
IV. THE EXISTING SOLUTIONS TO THE PROBLEM
The prevalent doctrine and the various reform proposals have tackled the
class action agency problem in numerous ways. The existing solutions to the
problem attempt to align the class attorney's self-interest with that of her
clients. Unfortunately, none of these solutions is satisfactory. In this part of the
Article, we outline these solutions along with their shortcomings.
A. Judicial Review of Settlements and Fees
In law, any settlement of a class action, and the fees to be received by the
class attorney under the settlement agreement, are subject to the court's
53approval. In deciding whether to approve a settlement, the court must act as a
52. See Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, The Plaintiffs' Attorney's Role in Class Action
and Derivative Litigation: Economic Analysis and Recommendations for Reform, 58 U. CHI. L. REV. 1,
105-16 (1991).
53. See FED. R. Civ. P. 23(e); Forbush v. J.C. Penney Co., 98 F.3d 817, 822 (5th Cir. 1996)
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protector of the class members' interests. It must conduct a hearing that will
allow every class member to voice opposition to the proposed settlement.
54
This is the law's principal solution to the class action agency problem. Due to
the intrinsically private information structure of the court proceedings and to
the consequent inability of the courts to uncover hidden information, 55 this
solution leaves the problem basically unresolved.56
B. Auctioning the Action
Under this proposal, the action would be auctioned between attorneys as an
economic asset. The attorney who outbids others would purchase the full
proprietary right in the action from the class members. 57 The defendant would
also be allowed to participate in the auction, but not through purportedly class
attorneys implanted as Trojan horses. 58 The class members would consequently
receive the highest price for their joint asset, and the agency problem would be
eliminated along with the principal-agent relationship.
This proposal is problematic for a number of reasons, well expounded by
the existing literature. The "winner's curse" problem is one such reason.
Because the action's actual value is unknown, the winning bid--one that
estimates the action's value at its highest-would entail the risk of
overpayment on the part of the bidder. Facing this risk, attorneys participating
in the auction would factor it into their bids. This process would reduce the
purchase price of the action to the detriment of the class members.59
(holding that class counsel's fee award needs court approval irrespective of the parties' agreements);
Piambino v. Bailey, 610 F.2d 1306, 1328 (5th Cir. 1980) (same). See generally HERBERT B. NEWBERG
& ALBA CONTE, NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTIONS §§ 14.01-.03 (3d ed. 1992) (citing caselaw both
acknowledging and structuring the courts' discretion to award class attorneys their fees).
54. See FED. R. Civ. P. 23(d)(2), (e)(l)(C).
55. As demonstrated by a recent experimental study, adversarial proceedings are generally
unsuitable for revealing hidden facts under a private information structure. See Michael K. Block et al.,
An Experimental Comparison of Adversarial Versus Inquisitorial Procedural Regimes, 2 AM. L. &
ECON. REv. 170 (2000).
56. As already indicated, an opposition to a class action settlement would face severe informational
difficulties: typically, its members are considerably less informed about the case and its merits than the
settlement union, formed by the class attorney and the defendant, is. In order to be effective, an
opposition to a settlement must overcome those difficulties, which would happen only on very rare
occasions. Building an adequate opposition to a skillfully designed class action settlement might also be
prohibitively expensive. The familiar collective action problems, and especially that of free-riding,
would usually prevent the class members from making the necessary investment. The courts'
supervisory role would thus scarcely create the desired panacea. Once the adversarial clash between the
class attorney and the defendant is replaced by a masterfully documented consensus ad idem, to which a
cohort of reputable experts have attached their blessings and praise, the settlement hearing would
practically be turned into an ex parte proceeding. Consequently, even when the court overcomes its
docket-clearing temptation, a facially reasonable settlement would pass muster.
57. This proposal belongs to Macey & Miller, supra note 52.
58. As stated earlier, see supra notes 47-48 and accompanying text, we assume that the existing
criminal, disciplinary and tort sanctions sufficiently deter such explicit collusions.
59. See Randall S. Thomas & Robert G. Hansen, Auctioning Class Action and Derivative Lawsuits:
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Another problem-that of liquidity-is this proposal's major deficiency. 60
The liquidity problem is two-fold: it substantially reduces the competition in
the class attorney market, and it imposes substantial costs on the auction
participants, which would adversely affect their bids. Inability to raise the
capital necessary for purchasing the class action would disqualify a large
number of both able and well-motivated class counsel, thus leaving the arena to
those few who are able to raise the capital. This monopolizing effect promises a
lower amount of recovery for individual victims and a lower level of deterrence
for corporate wrongdoers. Raising the capital necessary for purchasing the
class action would also incur substantial costs. These costs would be deducted
from the bids made by the auction participants, which would reduce the amount
of compensation recovered by the class members.
6 1
C. Franchising Law Enforcement
This proposal is a variation of the auction proposal. Under this proposal,
the highest bidder amongst participating attorneys would receive a franchise to
monitor a given geographical area and prosecute for specified types of
violations. Money received from that attorney (and from the winners of the
parallel auctions) in exchange for the franchise right would be allocated
amongst the violations' victims.
62
In addition to the liquidity problem that has already been mentioned,
A Critical Analysis, 87 Nw. U. L. REV. 423, 447 (1993) (explaining the "winner's curse" problem).
Arguably, because the defendant has an informational advantage over other bidders, the law should
prohibit him from participating in the auction. The defendant's participation in the auction, as a factor
intensifying the "winner's curse", would bring the competing bids further down. Acting under
asymmetric information as against the defendant, the bidding attorneys would rationally fear that
outbidding the defendant would involve paying too much for the action. Id. at 448-49 (favoring the
defendant's exclusion from the auction on the above grounds). Professors Thomas and Hansen also
point to the problematics of pre-auction discovery as yet another reason for rejecting the action-selling
auction proposal. See id. at 450-56. This problem, however, is rectifiable: one of the ways of rectifying
it is to adopt our model of pre-auction discovery. See infra Part V1.
60. See Samuel Issacharoff, Governance and Legitimacy in the Law of Class Actions, 1999 SUP.
CT. REV. 337, 375 n.134 (2000) (noting that the auction proposal would be impracticable in the mass
tort context, where "the sheer size of the claims at stake would exceed the resources of even the most
well-heeled plaintiffs' firms"). See also Developments in the Law, supra note 40, at 1848-49
(acknowledging that "[t]he purchase of class actions would require considerable financial resources"
and suggesting attenuating this problem by allowing attorneys to effect such purchases with the help of
commercial debt instruments).
61. Guy Halfteck brought to our attention a different scenario in which the liquidity constraint
disqualifies less capable bidders because more capable bidders are able to extract higher returns from
the auctioned claims at relatively lower costs. This prospect enables the more capable bidders to acquire
capital more cheaply. The shrinking pool of bidders would weaken competition among attorneys and
reduce the prices for which class actions would be sold, but the quality of the bidding attorneys would
become higher on average. To spread the cost of capital, some of the bidding attorneys would also form
alliances with others, which would further reduce competition, but would improve the quality of the
bidding attorneys. The resulting trade-off between the reduced competition and the improved quality of
class attorneys is unclear.
62. See Coffee, supra note 49, at 692.
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implementation of this proposal would produce two difficult problems which
are probably insurmountable. The bidding mechanism that would have to be
employed under this proposal would tend to unduly reduce the amount of
compensation that would be recovered by the victims.
63
Apart from that, the franchise owners would monopolize the relevant law-
enforcement powers. For obvious reasons, this monopoly would be liable to
abuse. Once isolated from the competitive market, the franchise-owner would
tend to magnify her earnings through monopoly rather than by productive
efforts. Her case-selection decisions would be oriented towards producing a
lesser amount of goods that are priced more expensively; in using her scarce
resources, the franchise-owner would prefer prosecuting only those cases
where her earnings-as determined by the difference between her expected
return from the case and her investment in it-are at their highest. No condition
set by the franchise agreement is capable of resolving this problem (the
possibility that the franchise-owner will be explicitly bribed by defendants is
once again ignored). The aggregate enforcement output would consequently be
reduced, thus undercutting the deterrence and compensation objectives of the
law.
64
D. Auctions for Class Attorney Services
Federal District Judge Vaughan Walker was the first to appoint class
attorneys by conducting auctions for their services. 65 In these auctions, the
competing attorneys had to submit sealed bids indicating their proposed fees as
percentages from recovery, flat or sliding. The bids could also propose early-
66 6
settlement discounts, as well as caps on the attorney's expenses." Each bid
had to be submitted independently, and the bidder had to certify that she did
not cooperate with her competitors in preparing and submitting the bid.68 The
bidder also had to specify her qualifications for the class counsel position.
69
Finally, the court would select the bidding package that promises to generate
the largest recovery amount for the suing class by undertaking to charge the
63. Because franchise rights would have to be sold prior to violations and their discovery, auction
participants would have to base their bids on the average rate of violations and on the average damage
inflicted by each type of violation. See id.. This factor and the corresponding conservative assessments
would reduce the amount of victims' compensation.
64. See id at 692-93.
65. See In re Oracle Securities Litig., 136 F.R.D. 639 (N.D. Cal. 1991); 132 F.R.D. 538 (N.D. Cal.
1990); 131 F.R.D. 688 (N.D. Cal. 1990).
66. See Oracle, 132 F.R.D. at 545.
67. Id. at 539, 542-43.
68. See Oracle, 131 F.R.D. at 697.
69. Id.
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lowest amount of fees and expenses. 70
Flat percentage arrangements induce the attorney to strike an early
settlement with the defendant at the class members' expense. For that reason,
an attorney proposing a flat percentage fee will reduce her chances of winning
the auction. Under sliding percentage arrangements, the attorney's fee was to
either increase or decrease as the amount of recovery increased. Each type of
the sliding percentage fee-arrangement has both advantages and disadvantages.
The decreasing percentage-of-recovery fee prevents the attorney from
obtaining a windfall fee award. Under such arrangements, the class members
would share the attorney's economies of effort. 71 However, such an
arrangement creates a decline in the attorney's marginal returns for efforts.
There is, therefore, a point at which the attorney's opportunity costs will begin
to exceed her expected fee. At that point, the attorney will accept a cheap
settlement offer to the detriment of the suing class. 72 A fee discount for an early
settlement will rectify this problem only partially because it merely induces the
attorney to extend the duration of the litigation, instead of maximizing the
amount of recovery for her clients.
73
The increasing percentage-of-recovery fee induces the class attorney "to
avoid premature settlement and push for a higher plaintiffs' recovery."
74
However, as Judge Kaplan observes in Auction Houses,
This fee structure might have the effect of encouraging plaintiffs' lawyers to
eschew settlement in search of a very high recovery, even if this strategy is overly
risky from plaintiffs' perspective. Further, it is not clear a priori how to demarcate
the increments of plaintiffs' recovery according to which counsel's fee
correspondingly will increase. Setting the increments too low might eliminate the
positive effect of the increasing percentage-of-recovery method on counsel's
incentives because the opposing parties, after some discovery, will come to value
the case in the highest range, eliminating some of the upside benefit to lead counsel
of a higher settlement. Conversely, if the increments are set too high, it might
become apparent after some discovery that the case will be valued only in the
lowest range. This in turn can make the litigation too costly for lead counsel,
thereby encouraging ?remature cheap settlement in order to extricate counsel
quickly from the case.
More fundamentally, the cheapest representation of class members-an
objective that Judge Walker's auction approach aims to attain-is not
70. See Oracle, 132 F.R.D. at 541-47. In subsequent cases, Judge Walker conducted similar
auctions featuring various improvements. See Wenderhold v. Cylink, 191 F.R.D. 600 (N.D. Cal. 2000);
188 F.R.D. 577 (N.D. Cal. 1999); In re California Micro Devices Sec. Litig., 168 F.R.D. 257 (N.D. Cal.
1996); In re Wells Fargo Sec. Litig., 157 F.R.D. 467 (N.D. Cal. 1994).
71. See Oracle, 132 F.R.D. at 543-44.
72. See In re Auction Houses Antitrust Litig., 197 F.R.D. 71, 80 (S.D.N.Y. 2000).
73. Id.
74. Id. at 80. See generally Bruce L. Hay, The Theory of Fee Regulation in Class Action
Settlements, 46 AM. U. L. REV. 1429 (1997) (offering an economic analysis of fee-caps for class
attorneys).
75. See Auction Houses, 197 F.R.D. at 81.
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necessarily the best-quality representation. 76 Professor Samuel Issacharoff
astutely remarked about this method that, "As with dentistry, there may be
some pain associated with delivering yourself to professionals whose chief
attribute is their willingness to work you over cheaply." 77 Therefore, although
numerous courts have adopted Judge Walker's approach, 78 both with and
without variations, 79 the Auction Houses court declined to follow it.
80
This court has devised a different auction, which holds a promise of better
representation for class members. Initially, the Auction Houses court ordered
that the competing attorneys submit sealed bids that state two figures, X and Y.
The X figure was to represent the recovery amount that would go entirely to the
class members, free of the attorney's fees and other expenses. 81 The Y figure
was to represent "any gross recovery in excess of X' that would go entirely to
the class attorney.82 The court further provided that it will keep all the bids
secret "prior to the earlier of (a) final adjudication of the action, or (b) notice to
the class of a proposed settlement";8 3 and it ordered in this connection that the
selected class attorney "not disclose the terms of its bid to defendants or
76. Id. See also John C. Coffee Jr., The Unfaithful Champion: The Plaintiff as Monitor in
Shareholder Litigation, LAW AND CONTEMP. PROBS., Summer 1985, at 77.
77. Issacharoff, supra note 60, at 375 n.134. See also FED. R. Civ. P. 23(g)(1)(C) (proposed
amendments) (stating that when appointing an attorney class counsel, the court must consider, amongst
other factors, counsel's experience in handling class actions and other complex litigation and the
resources counsel will commit to representing the class, and allowing the court to consider any other
matter pertinent to counsel's ability to fairly and adequately represent the interests of the class).
Furthermore, scarcity of information at the auction stage would prevent informed bidding by
participating attorneys. These attorneys would consequently tend to undervalue the expected recovery,
thus offering higher fees for lower recovery amounts. See Issacharoff, supra note 60, at 375 n. 134. This
problem emanates from the "winner's curse." See Thomas & Hansen, supra note 59, at 446-48 (arguing
that the "winner's curse" problem prevents efficient auctioning of class actions). We believe, however,
that this deficiency can be rectified by adopting our mechanism for pre-auction discovery. See infra Part
VI.
78. See In re Bank One S'holders Class Actions, 96 F. Supp. 2d 780 (N.D. Ill. 2000); In re Lucent
Techs. Inc. Sec. Litig., 194 F.R.D. 137 (D.N.J. 2000); Sherleigh Assocs. v. Windmere-Durable
Holdings, Inc., 186 F.R.D. 669 (S.D. Fla. 1999); 184 F.R.D. 688 (S.D. Fla. 1999); In re Network
Assocs. Inc., 76 F. Supp. 2d 1017 (N.D. Cal. 1999); In re Cendant Corp. Litig., 182 F.R.D. 144 (D.N.J.
1998); In re Amino Acid Lysine Antitrust Litig., 918 F. Supp. 1190 (N.D. I11. 1996).
79. The most important of these variations was the right of first refusal that some courts gave to the
lead plaintiffs attorney. This right allowed that attorney to match the terms of the winning bid.
Underlying this right was the court's unwillingness to abolish the "first-to-file" principle that "creates an
incentive for attorneys to ferret out wrongs that may be difficult or impossible for individual plaintiffs
ever to identify." Auction Houses, 197 F.R.D. at 81. See, e.g., Cendant, 182 F.R.D. 144. As further
indicated in Auction Houses, 197 F.R.D. at 81-82: "Granting counsel to the lead plaintiff a right of first
refusal conceivably might address this concern by promising the attorney that incurred the search costs,
if willing to offer his or her services at a competitive price, a reward for this action. However, a right of
first refusal takes control over the selection of lead counsel out of the court's hands and thereby
undermines the court's ability to ensure that the class receives the highest quality representation."
80. Auction Houses, 197 F.R.D. at 80-85.
81. Id. at 73.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 74.
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anyone else without approval of the Court."' 8 4 The court also laid down a
number of supplementary provisions for its auction, 85 and explicitly stated that,
"if the Court decided to use the bids in selecting lead counsel, lead counsel
would be selected on the basis of both the economic terms of the bids and the
qualifications of the bidder."86 The court thus retained its discretion in selecting
the bidder, although it explicitly stated the auction's ultimate purpose:
87
maximizing the plaintiffs' recovery (the X figure).
This auctioning method has a number of advantages. First, it induces the
bidders to compete over the guaranteed recovery amount for the suing class
(X). Second, it requires the bidders to underwrite the possible non-fulfillment
of this guarantee with their fees. The resulting attorneys' incentives thus seem
to provide the suing class with the best prospect to receive the feasibly highest
amount of compensation. Under this method, the selected class attorney would
still be able to accept the defendant's early settlement offer, but any such offer
would equal X + Y. Therefore, the attorney's acceptance of such an offer would
not be detrimental to the class.
88
This method, however, also has several disadvantages. First, as already
indicated in relation to Judge Walker's auction method, lack of discovery
would ordinarily foil the bidders' attempts at evaluating the action's
prospects. 89 We believe that the pre-auction discovery problem is rectifiable
and offer its rectification in our subsequent discussion.90 However, the Auction
Houses court did not supplement its auction with an appropriate mechanism for
discovery, which clearly reduces the attractiveness of such auctions both for
84. Id.
85. The court ruled that one-fourth "of any recovery in excess of Y would be paid to lead counsel
as additional compensation and three fourths to the class." The court further ruled that each bidder was
to "submit a brief memorandum setting forth the basis for and supporting the bid. The briefs were to
explain the bidders' respective evaluations of the case, including their assumptions as to possible and
likely recoveries in the event liability were established, and the bases therefor." Auction Houses, 197
F.R.D. at 73. The court also required that each bidder submit
a sworn certification that the bidder had not, directly or indirectly, communicated with (1) any
other bidder concerning the terms of the bid or its position with respect to whether the Court
should adopt this method, (2) any defendant or prospective defendant following the issuance
of the order concerning settlement or possible settlement of any or all of the actions, or (3) any
other attorney or firm concerning its possible performance of legal or other services for the
bidder in connection with this litigation in the event the bidder were selected as lead counsel.
Id. at 73 n.9. The court clarified that "any compensation awarded to the successful bidder was to be
inclusive of all costs, disbursements and other charges incurred in connection with the litigation"; and it
reserved its discretion "to compensate lead counsel on a different basis in the event the litigation were
resolved in a manner that did not permit determination of a gross recovery by the class or if justice
otherwise required." Id.
86. Auction Houses, 197 F.R.D. at 73.
87. Id. at 83-84.
88. Id. at 83.
89. See supra note 59 and sources cited therein.
90. See infra Part VI.
Vol. 22:69, 2004
Auctioning for Loyalty
prospective bidders and for their future clients. 91
Second, the Auction Houses decision provides no guidance for evaluating
the bids. Indeed, this evaluation is bound to be complex because it involves two
variables, X and Y, rather than merely one variable. Take, for example, Bidder
1, who sets a $100 million value on X and $30 million on Y, and compare her
with Bidder 2 whose X and Y figures are, respectively, $105 million and $45
million. The court examines the professional and the ethical credentials of these
bidders and finds them both adequate and indistinguishable from each other.
Which of these two bidders is likely to represent the class members more
faithfully, more diligently and more professionally than the other? Can the
court adequately answer the same question in relation to two other bids, one of
which set slightly lower values on both X and Y than did the other? These
problems appear. unresolvable. Indeed, due to these operational problems, and
in light of a more fundamental difficulty, to which we now turn, the Auction
Houses court decided to modify its original auction order.
92
Third, the original auction formula set by the Auction Houses court induces
bidders to magnify their Y figures. This formula therefore creates a serious
conflict of interests between the class members and the selected class attorney.
Take, for example, a winning bid that placed both X and Y at $20 million. The
attorney who submitted this bid estimated that she has a 50% chance of
obtaining compensatory damages for her future clients to the amount of $50
million. She further estimated that there is a 5% chance that her clients will
also receive punitive damages to the amount of $300 million. From the
attorney's viewpoint, the expected value of the action thus equals $40 million
($50m x 50% + $300m x 5%). This estimation determined the attorney's sum
of X and Y, and it won the auction because other attorneys set considerably
lower values on X. Now assume that the defendant's lawyers managed to dispel
his concerns about punitive damages. Consequently, the defendant offers the
attorney to settle the case for $25 million. This settlement would yield the class
members $20 million, which is their maximal recovery, and it would
remunerate the attorney with a $5 million fee. In these circumstances, the
attorney may well reject the defendant's offer and go to trial, even though it
would not be in her clients' interests. By going to trial, this attorney would risk
her clients' recovery in order to augment her profit from the action.
93
91. Arguably, the court did not supplement its auction with a discovery mechanism because the
latter was unnecessary: the principal item of information upon which the competing attorneys relied in
placing their bids-the Interim Committee's Expert Analysis that conducted a study of potential
damages-was public information released by the court. See Auction Houses, 197 F.R.D. at 74. See also
TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 11, at 716 (referring to this factor as justifying the auction conducted
in Auction Houses).
92. See Auction Houses, 197 F.R.D. at 83-84.
93. See Auction Houses, 197 F.R.D. at 83 (identifying this conflict of interests and exemplifying it
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Fourth, an overoptimistic attorney might commit herself to an unreasonably
high X figure. Subsequently, she might discover her mistake and its no-fee
consequence. After that upsetting discovery, the attorney would hardly be
willing to invest further resources in a zealous prosecution of her clients'
action.
Facing those difficulties, the Auction Houses court issued a new order that
modified one of the conditions of its original auction. The new order imposed a
limit on the Y figure. Under this order, the bidding attorneys had to commit
themselves only to the value of X. The court set the selected attorney's fee at
25% of any amount that the plaintiffs would receive in excess of X.94 The court
explained this ruling as follows:
As counsel will receive no fee if plaintiffs' recovery falls below X, counsel clearly
is discouraged from settling prematurely and has an incentive to pursue a recovery
higher than X. This effort will accrue to the benefit of both counsel and the class.
As the value of the case surpasses X, counsel's marginal returns to effort will
increase steadily, as they will receive twenty-five percent of any amount in excess
of X. Again, this creates an incentive for counsel to litigate the case aggressively.
Insofar as the Y variable has been eliminated, so too has the conflict of interest.
This modified auction formula proved beneficial for the Auction Houses
class members, who sued two renowned auction houses, Christie's and
Sotheby's, for price-fixing. The auction winner, Boies, Schiller & Flexner LLP,
set X at $405 million, and within six months reached a $512 million settlement
with the defendants. This settlement yielded the class members $485.25 million
in money damages, and the class attorneys recovered fees and expenses to the
amount of $26.75 million.96
The Auction Houses modified formula is, however, still inadequate. Take
an attorney who estimates the action's expected value at $50 million, an
estimation based on her 50% chance of winning $100 million for her
prospective clients. The attorney is willing to take up the case for no less than
$5 million, so her bid sets Xat $30 million and wins the auction. The defendant
is unaware of the attorney's bid, but is informed-as we are---of the auction's
formula. After discovery, the defendant's assessment of the action's expected
value becomes roughly similar to that of the class attorney, so he offers her to
settle the case for $40 million. The defendant makes this offer precisely
with a different hypothetical); John C. Coffee, Jr., 'Auction Houses': Legal Ethics and the Class Action,
N.Y. L.J., May 18, 2000, at 5. (same).
By conventional standards, our attorney's behavior is plainly unethical. See Auction Houses, 197
F.R.D. at 83. Yet, the attorney might argue that the 5% chance of winning the $300 million punitive-
damage award is part of her compensation for attorney services. Furthermore, the attorney might argue
that she acquired a partnership share in the action in the amount of $20 million, which she is not willing
to give up for $5 million. These arguments are legally unacceptable, but they do highlight the
problematics of the Ownership paradigm that informed the Auction Houses decision.
94. See Auction Houses, 197 F.R.D. at 84.
95. Id.
96. See Mark Hamblett, Debate Over Sotheby's Fee-Auction Plan Persists, N.Y. L.J., Nov. 22,
2000, at I (reporting and discussing the above settlement).
Vol. 22:69, 2004
Auctioning for Loyalty
because he is aware of the auction's formula: he knows that, under this
formula, the X figure must have been set far below the action's expected value.
If the attorney accepts that offer, she will receive $2.5 million in fees and
expenses, which is half of her expected earning from the action. The attorney
therefore decides to litigate the case. For reasons already provided,97 this
decision is manifestly detrimental to the plaintiffs' interests. 98 Hence, the
formula that the Auction Houses court finally adopted still leaves room for a
conflict of interests between the class attorney and her clients. Moreover, by
allowing corporate defendants to create such a conflict by making a unilateral
settlement offer, this formula equips defendants with a damaging tactical
opportunity. Aware of that opportunity, attorneys competing in the auction may
decide to adjust their bids by lowering the X sums. For obvious reasons, such
downward adjustments would be detrimental to the suing class.
The foregoing discussion allows us to identify two fundamental drawbacks
in each variant of the Auction Houses bidding formula. First, the court's stated
objective in Auction Houses was to optimize the lawyering service that the
class attorney was to offer to the plaintiffs.99 The Servantship paradigm of class
litigation is therefore this objective's natural domain. The court, however,
chose the Ownership paradigm as a platform for promoting this objective.
Unsurprisingly, the fundamental discrepancy between the two paradigms holds
unhappy prospects for the suing class. By granting the class attorney a share in
the action, the court effectively created a joint-asset partnership between the
attorney and the plaintiffs. The partnership's goal is to sell the joint asset to the
defendant-by a settlement or through a court judgment-and to divide the
profits in accordance with the partners' shares. Under the partnership's
conditions, the plaintiffs cash their share first, and the attorney's share cashes
second. The value of this partnership's asset and, correspondingly, the value of
each partner's share depend on the way in which the attorney represents the
plaintiffs. Under this framework, conflict of interests between the attorney and
her clients is inevitable. Selling the joint asset for any price that allows the
plaintiffs to cash their share would clearly be in the plaintiffs' interest. The
attorney, however, would be unwilling to sell the asset for a price that does not
allow her to cash her share profitably, and it is she-not the plaintiffs-who
decides whether to sell the asset through a settlement agreement. Furthermore,
this conflict of interests may be unilaterally effected by the defendant. The
defendant may create such a conflict by offering the attorney to settle the case
97. Coffee, supra note 93 and accompanying text.
98. Cf John C. Coffee, Jr., Untangling the 'Auction Houses' Aftermath, N.Y. L.J., November 30,
2000, at 1 (criticizing the Auction Houses modified formula by using a different conflict-of-interest
example).
99. Auction Houses, 197 F.R.D. at 75.
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for an amount that pays enough for the plaintiffs' first-to-cash share in the
action, but not enough for the attorney's second-to-cash share.
An ownership-transfer mechanism can attain the adequate-service objective
only by inducing the provider of the required service (the selected class
attorney) to purchase full ownership in the serviced asset (the class action). 100
The class action doctrine must therefore either adopt the Ownership paradigm
in its entirety or discard it completely in favor of the Servantship paradigm.
Halfway solutions, such as that of the Auction Houses court, will not do.
Indeed, the unbridgeable gap between the two paradigms is the origin of the
class attorney's anomalous position under the Auction Houses approach. This
approach attempts to align the attorney's private incentives with those of her
clients at a totally arbitrary point in time: the pre-filing stage. Subsequently, it
leaves the attorney on her own, so the attorney becomes free of virtually any
market or legal mechanisms that could monitor her performance and direct it
towards her clients' benefit.
Second, none of the Auction Houses bidding formulae induces the
competing attorneys to explicitly base their bids on the class action's expected
value. In fact, each of these formulae motivates the attorneys to bid for
amounts that exceed this value and subsequently to attempt to recover those
amounts. The X-and-Y formula, originally endorsed by the court, tells the
bidders: "The one who will place the highest value on the X figure is most
likely to win the auction. As for the Y figure, you can set it as high as you wish:
as long as the plaintiffs recover the highest possible X amount, no one would
care how much you earned." Consequently, an attorney correctly estimating the
action's expected value as $100 million would do better by setting $90 million
on X and $60 million on Y than by placing X at $75 million and Y at $25
million. The former bid increases the attorney's chances of winning the
auction. Subsequently, it would allow her to utilize her clients' share in the
action as a gambling chip in her long-shot pursuit of high recovery. At several
points in time, the attorney may also decide to abandon this gambling strategy
by opting for a solid Y= $10m fallback. This fallback option would be open to
her as long as the defendant is willing to settle the case for its expected value.
The 25% x (Y-X) formula for the attorney's fee is no better. Take attorney
A who correctly estimates the action's expected value as $100 million and is
willing to take it up for a modest flat fee of 5%. This attorney would have to
visualize $100 million as representing her formally unstated Y and to place X at
$80 million. However, the attorney's $80 million bid would say nothing about
the action's expected value and the attorney's proposed fee amount. Thus, a
different attorney (B) could place the same bid after incorrectly estimating the
100. This full-purchase-of-the-action approach was recommended by Macey & Miller, supra note
52.
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expected value of the action as $160 million and after setting her fee at a flat
12.5% rate. The 25% x (Y - X) formula is indifferent as between these two
attorneys, which hardly replicates the rationally hypothesized attitude of the
class members. From the class members' perspective, attorney A is preferable
to attorney B because A would rightly accept the defendant's $100 million
settlement offer, while B would reject it.
The failure of both Auction Houses formulae to elicit the expected value of
the action from the bidding attorneys creates serious informational deficiency
that is bound to produce anomalies. This informational deficiency impairs the
formulae: the expected value of the action is a factor necessary for securing the
adequacy of legal representation that the class attorney provides to the suing
class. For the Auction Houses court, this factor was immaterial since the court
grounded its decision on the belief that, by acquiring a second-to-cash share in
the action, the attorney will align her private interests with those of the suing
class. As demonstrated above, that belief is ill-founded. The court acted on that
belief because it adopted the Ownership paradigm as its baseline. Indeed, this
baseline is the ultimate source of the problems that accompany the court's
auctions, both original and amended.
To these problems we now add an additional difficulty: under both
auctions, even the most skillful of -the bidding attorneys may find herself
uncompensated. Take an attorney. who wins the auction and subsequently
delivers to her clients the amount X (or a lesser amount). Under the auction's
conditions, this attorney would earn no fee. Yet, the delivered amount is much
larger than the X-sums offered by other attorneys who took part in the auction.
In such circumstances, denying the attorney her fee would be both inefficient
and unfair. Absence of rewards for the best assessment of the action's value
weakens the bidders' incentive to base their bids on that assessment.
Weakening of that incentive is bound to produce distortions in the selection of
class attorneys. As far as fairness is concerned, because the attorney in our
example acted as the plaintiffs' best available representative, the plaintiffs must
pay her for her services.'
°0
For these reasons, this Article proposes an altogether different auction that
abandons the Ownership paradigm in favor of the Servantship approach. Based
on the Servantship approach, our solution avoids all the problems that the
Auction Houses court failed to avoid. We unfold and justify this solution in
Part V.
101. See Savoie v. Merchants Bank, 166 F.3d 456, 460 (2d Cir. 1999) ("A party whose initiative
confers a benefit upon a class of people is entitled to recover its costs-including attorneys' fees-from
the common fund.").
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E. Multiplying the Damages
This proposal seeks to align the class attorney's and the class members'
litigation objectives. Under this proposal, the class members' compensation
would increase most dramatically. Specifically, the plaintiffs' actual damages
would be multiplied by 1/f when f, we recall, denotes the attorney's
shareholding in the lawsuit. 102 The fee to be recovered by the attorney in the
event of victory would consequently amount to the class members' actual
damages. The lawsuit's settlement value for the class members would equal
PR(1/f- 1). For the class attorney, it would amount to PR - C, and for the
defendant to (1/J)PR + C. Between the class attorney and the defendant, the
settlement range would still remain large: it would equal
PR(I/f- 1) + 2C. The action's settlement range would thus still encompass the
expected gain for the class members (together with the class attorney's and the
defendant's litigation costs). However, the ensuing settlement would not take
away from the suing class any part of the compensation for its actual, as
opposed to multiplied, damage (net of the class attorney's fee). The expected
aggregate recovery of the class would never go below PR(1 -ft in reality, it
would almost certainly be far above that amount. This would be so because the
class attorney would not agree to a settlement that would leave her with a fee
below PR - C. Under this condition, the minimum settlement amount would be
(PR - C)/f
This corrective mechanism, however, would be purchased too expensively.
First, it would produce a profound ethical anomaly: class attorneys would be
awarded a multiplied fee in order not to be bribed by defendants; class
members would be grossly overcompensated in order not to be betrayed by
their attorneys; and defendants would be forced to grossly overcompensate
class members and overpay class attorneys as part of an economic therapy that
would help them overcome their temptation to bribe the attorneys. Apart from
producing this anomaly, adoption of the multiplied damage proposal would
generate over-deterrence, which blemishes the proposal beyond repair. From
the deterrence perspective, multiplied or other punitive damages can be
justified only as an award-correcting tool in a system that suffers from
drawbacks in law-enforcement. Thus, if such drawbacks reduce the rightful
imposition of liability to one-third in the average, and if that reduction is
reasonably known to potential violators, then those defendants who were found
liable should be forced to pay treble damages to the plaintiffs. ° 3 There is,
102. Coffee, supra note 49, at 693-95 (arguing that "multiple damages can be defended as a crude
approximation of the [problem's] optimal solution").
103. See A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, Punitive Damages: An Economic Analysis, 11l
HARV. L. REV. 870, 887-900 (1998) (demonstrating that imposition of punitive damages can offset
drawbacks in law-enforcement); A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, Punitive Damages, in 3 THE
NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS AND THE LAW 192, 193-94 (Peter Newman ed., 1998)
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however, no connection (let alone overlap) between such damage multipliers
and the award multiplier 1/f whose sole function is to align the class attorney's
and the class members' litigation objectives.
F. Restoring Client Control
Theoretically, if one could remove the class members' collective-action and
transaction-cost problems, so that the suing class could pursue its interests as a
single owner, the class action agency problem could be reduced to a tolerable
minimum. The class members would then appoint an attorney of their own
choice and subsequently negotiate the attorney's fee and monitor her actions. In
1995, to attain this objective in private securities litigation, Congress enacted
the PSLRA. "' This piece of legislation requires courts to determine whether a
lead plaintiff can oversee the conduct of the class action litigation and monitor
the effectiveness of counsel. 10 5 It also lays down a presumption in favor of
appointing to the lead-plaintiff position an investor, or a group of investors,
with the largest financial interest among the named plaintiffs' 0 6 in the class
action.1 0 7 Because such investors arguably have the strongest incentive to
succeed in the action, and because the court must be satisfied-prior to their
appointment-that their interests align with those of the class as a whole,'
0 8
their appointment as lead plaintiffs would minimize the extent of the agency
problem that arises in class actions. Furthermore, selection of counsel by the
lead plaintiff must be the product of deliberate and in-depth evaluation, as well
as of independent, arms-length negotiations. 109 Indeed, the lead plaintiff owes
the suing class a fiduciary duty to obtain the highest quality representation at
the lowest price." 0 In deciding whether to approve the selected counsel, the
court must ensure the performance of that duty." '
This client-control model seeks to single out the best plaintiff-that is, the
class member whose interests most align with those of the class as a whole-in
order to entrust the action to that plaintiffs hands. Under this model, the best
plaintiff is the class member with the largest stake in the action. Arguably, this
(same).
104. Private Securities Litigation Reform Act (PSLRA), Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737 (1995)
(codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a to 78 u-5.). As already mentioned, this piece of legislation drew on Weiss
& Beckerman, supra note 21.
105. See, e.g., In re Lucent Techs., Inc., Sec. Litig. 194 F.R.D. 137, 145-46, 152-55 (D.N.J. 2000)
(stating and applying this requirement).
106. Including claimants who "made a motion in response to a notice." See 15 U.S.C. § 78u-
4(a)(3 )(B3)(iii)(1)(aa), (a)()(A)(i)(ll).
107. 15 U.S.C. § 78u- 4(a)(3)(B)(iii)(I)(bb).
108. In re Lucent Techs., Inc., Sec. Litig., 194 F.R.D. 137, 144-45, 150-51 (D.N.J. 2000).
109. Id. at 155.
110. Id. at 156 (citing In re Network Assocs., Inc., 76 F. Supp. 2d 1017, 1033 (N.D.Cal. 1999)).
111. Id. at 155-57.
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member of the class would suffer from the attorney's agency problem more
than any of his fellows and would consequently have the greatest interest in
tackling this problem. If the action yields recovery for the class members, then,
together with the class attorney, this plaintiff would be awarded for his
monitoring efforts and other investments in the action. This member of the
suing class consequently becomes more than just a nominal plaintiff, picked up
by the purported class attorney when she hunted for a class action opportunity.
Arguably, this plaintiff would adequately control the class attorney's actions
and thus curb the attorney's self-seeking temptations.
Unfortunately, this model has a manifestly limited scope for application: it
is suitable only for securities class actions, in which one can plausibly identify
the largest stockholder amongst the suing class.'1 2 Apart from that, this model
would hardly provide a panacea for the suing class: contrary to its inventors'
intentions, it merely replaces one agency problem with another." 
3
G. "Voice, " "Exit, " and "Loyalty"
In a recent article, Professor John Coffee presented a framework that
enhances the class members' "voice" and "exit" in order to secure their
attorney's loyalty.' 14 Analogous to that of corporate governance," t5 this
framework aims at reducing the extent of the agency problem that arises in
class actions." 6 Under this framework, "voice" means sufficient ability of the
class members to elect and remove their attorney and to make meaningful
collective decisions concerning their lawsuit; "exit" means sufficient ability of
the class members to opt out from the lawsuit; and "loyalty" means adequate
representation of the class members by their attorney." 7 Development of an
efficient market for "exit" is Professor Coffee's innovative proposal for
sustaining this framework. To develop such a market, Coffee advances the idea
112. Weiss & Beckerman, supra note 21 (limiting this model to securities class actions).
113. Under this model, instead of entering into a collusive settlement with the class attorney, the
defendant would attempt to strike such a settlement with the class representative (either directly or
through the class attorney, both appointed and controlled by that representative). In the securities area,
opportunities for such collusion are ample. Institutional investors seek profitable investments, better
access to corporate information, and greater influence over corporate governance decisions. They might
therefore purchase those benefits from defendant corporations by sacrificing the interests of the other
members of the class. Jill E. Fisch, Class Action Reform: Lessons from Securities Litigation, 39 ARIZ. L.
REV. 533, 548-49 (1997). Apart from that, institutional investors can extract private gains from attorneys
appointed by them as lead class action counsel. For example, they may obtain substantial fee discounts
from the appointed attorney for services unrelated to the class action. In exchange, they might offer the
attorney unfettered control over the action. Id. at 550.
114. See Coffee, supra note 25.
115. See generally ALBERT O. HIRSCHMAN, EXIT, VOICE, AND LOYALTY: RESPONSES TO DECLINE
IN FIRMS, ORGANIZATIONS, AND STATES (1970) (originally developing the "voice," "exit," and "loyalty"
vocabulary).
116. In a separate article, Professor Samuel Issacharoff recommended a similar enhancement of
"voice," "exit," and "loyalty". See Issacharoff, supra note 60, at 366-80.
117. See Coffee, supra note 25, at 399-422; Issacharoff, supra note 60.
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of exposing the dispersed mass of claimants to rival solicitations by
attorneys. 18 As in the corporate governance context, a regime that allows such
counter-solicitation would expose the class action-more precisely, the class
counsel's power to control the action-to hostile takeovers by competing
attorneys. Such a solicitation, in Coffee's words, "is the equivalent of a hostile
tender offer because it asks class members to 'vote with their feet' and leave
one class action to join another."'"19 Arguably, class attorneys operating in this
competitive environment would have a sufficient incentive to avoid conflicts of
interests and to promote their clients' interests both loyally and
professionally. 1
20
This mechanism has obvious merits.12 At the same time, it suffers from a
serious limitation originating from its wholesale rejection of the Ownership
paradigm. The mechanism's refusal to grant the class attorney any proprietary
right in the action dilutes her incentive to invest resources in the action. Before
making any such investment, the attorney would consider the probability of
takeover as reducing her expected fee-earning. This dilution of the attorney's
incentive to invest in the action is detrimental to the interests of the suing class.
Seemingly, raising the attorney's fee would offset this dilution. This, however,
is only seemingly so: fee-raising would increase the rate of counter-
solicitations and the corresponding risk of takeover. This increased risk would
further erode the attorney's incentive to invest in the action (her possible
reimbursement for efforts and expenses would mitigate the problem only
partially). To maintain the requisite incentive, the law must protect the
attorney's control over the action as a payoff for her investment.
We therefore support the idea of contest between prospective class
attorneys, but argue that such contests must be conducted in a way that does
not jeopardize the class attorney's investment in the action. Before assuming
the role of a class attorney, an attorney expends resources on investigating
violations and on preparing the class action. Made by many attorneys at their
own risk, such preliminary investments do not require special protection. If an
attorney makes an insufficient preliminary investment in the class action, the
class members might still remain unaffected because the position of the class
counsel may ultimately go to another attorney. However, if an attorney under-
investing in the class action already represents the suing class, her
118. Coffee, supra note 25, at 422-28.
119. Id.at423.
120. Id. at 428.
121. As Professor Coffee acknowledges, this mechanism is not devoid of problems. Id. at 428-36.
Thus, it may produce "Balkanization": through internal divisions and holdouts, rival claimant forces
may make the litigation unmanageable. Professor Coffee believes that this problem is not
insurmountable. Id. For a more skeptical view of "exit," see Issacharoff, supra note 60, at 369-70, who
argues that dispersed class members cannot meaningfully exercise their "exit" right.
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underinvestment would be detrimental to her clients' interests. Therefore, an
attorney's appointment as a class counsel should end the attorneys' contest. For
the same reason, this appointment must also precede the attorney's investment
in discovery and other expensive proceedings.
This Article therefore offers a different model that accommodates these
conditions. 122 Similar to Professor Coffee's approach, this model adopts the
Servantship paradigm. However, the level of remuneration anxiety experienced
by our class servant is much lower than that of Professor Coffee's class servant.
We claim that our class servant would provide adequate services to his masters
and substantiate this claim in Part V.
H. Parens Patriae: Deprivatizing Class Action
This proposal tackles the class action agency problem by entrusting the
power to file and prosecute class actions in the hands of appropriate state
agencies. As demonstrated by Kenneth Dam in a seminal article on the
economics of class action, this parens patriae approach "has a worthy
lineage. ' 23 In areas where state agencies are unable to enforce the law
efficiently, a residual franchising of the power to file and prosecute lawsuits on
behalf of the state (as opposed to the individual victims of violations) can also
be bestowed upon private plaintiffs. 124 Fines collected from violators (or other
compulsory payments) would create a fund that can be used by the relevant
state agency for compensating the victims.' 25 In the eyes of this proposal's
proponents, the class action agency problem originates in the state's decision to
confer upon private legal entrepreneurs the license to sue on behalf of others.
Privatization of this law-enforcement power should therefore take the blame for
creating the problem. Arguably, states should de-privatize the power to initiate
and prosecute class actions.126
This proposal replaces the problem at hand with a host of other well-known
problems, most of which are associated with expansive bureaucracy. 12 These
problems include the reduced capacity of state agencies to detect low-scale and
medium-scale violations; the agencies' ingrained preference of deterrence over
122. See infra Part V.
123. Kenneth W. Dam, Class Actions: Efficiency, Compensation, Deterrence, and Conflict of
Interest, 4 J. LEG. STUD. 47, 64 (1975).
124. Cf Jill E. Fisch, Class Action Reform, Qui Tam, and the Role of the Plaintiff 60 LAW AND
CONTEMP. PROBS. 167, 184-202 (1997) (offering a shared private-public model of law enforcement).
125. See Dam, supra note 123, at 64-65. Victim compensation may also be replaced with fines,
which would create a deterrence-oriented regime akin to criminal law. Id. at 65-66.
126. For a recent discussion of the parens patriae doctrine, see Richard P. Ieyoub & Theodore
Eisenberg, State Attorney General Actions, the Tobacco Litigation, and the Doctrine ofParens Patriae,
74 TUL. L. REv. 1859 (2000) (furnishing a comprehensive analysis of the doctrine's merits and limits).
127. See generally GEORGE J. STIGLER, THE CITIZEN AND THE STATE: ESSAYS ON REGULATION
114 (1975) (arguing that since bureaucracies and their functioning depend on self-serving politicians,
they would be unable to properly protect citizens from abuses).
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compensatory objectives; their dependence upon biased politicians; budgetary
constraints; a potential for distorted incentives that might produce selective
law-enforcement, including predatory prosecutorial tactics, and so forth. 128 In
theory, and perhaps also in reality, these problems can be rectified.1 29 Their
rectification, however, would be rather costly.
V. THE PROPOSED SOLUTION: AUCTION, FEE FORFEITURE, AND A BAN ON
INADEQUATE SETTLEMENTS
This part of the Article offers a simple mechanism that resolves the class
action agency problem and virtually guarantees adequate compensation to class
members. We base this mechanism on the Servantship paradigm. In our model,
the normal settlement standard determines the adequate amount of
compensation. This amount is represented by the lawsuit's expected value. 130 If
class members recovered compensation below this amount, their compensation
would be inadequate, and the same goes for deterrence of corporate
wrongdoers. Prevention of such outcomes is our mechanism's primary
objective. We therefore propose a set of rules that modify the class attorney's
and the defendant's payoffs so that the two would no longer be able to settle
the action below its expected value amount. Class attorneys and defendants
consequently become unable to benefit themselves at the class members'
expense. Our model achieves this outcome by eliminating the conflict-of-
interests differential and by ensuring that the class attorney files the action for
the optimal amount. This operation of the model eliminates the class action
agency problem.
Promotion of settlements is another worthy objective that our mechanism
helps to attain. If that objective were unworthy-namely, if we were to treat a
settlement as a denial of justice-the extent of the class action agency problem
could then be reduced by prohibiting any settlement. In accordance with the
currently dominant view, our model prefers settlement to litigation.' 31 As
128. See RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF THE LAW 658-70 (5th ed., 1998) (pointing
to these problems and concluding that "the average agency is almost certain to be less well managed
than the average business firm"). See also leyoub & Eisenberg, supra note 126, at 1879-82
(acknowledging some of these problems, but claiming that the parens patriae doctrine can still yield
social benefits, and substantiating this claim by the socially beneficial settlement of the lawsuits that
forty-six states brought against the tobacco industry).
129. For various proposals in that area see Dam, supra note 123, at 66-70; Gary S. Becker &
George J. Stigler, Law Enforcement, Malfeasance, and Compensation of Enforcers, 3 J. LEGAL STUD. 1
(1974); William L. Landes & Richard A. Posner, The Private Enforcement of Law, 4 J. LEGAL STUD. 1
(1975); and A. Mitchell Polinsky, Private Versus Public Enforcement of Fines, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 105
(1980).
130. See Cooter & Rubinfeld, supra note 43 (depicting a lawsuit's expected value as a basis for
settling it out of court); Geoffrey P. Miller, Settlement of Litigation: A Critical Perspective, in
REFORMING THE CIVIL JUSTICE SYSTEM 13-19 (Larry Kramer ed., 1996) (same).
131. See Miller, id. at 21-25 (arguing that settlement is generally preferable to litigation). For
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already indicated, however, our model does not prefer settlement to litigation at
any price. This model prefers a settlement to litigation only when its amount
reflects the expected value of the lawsuit, so the plaintiffs are not under-
compensated and the defendants are not under-deterred. We therefore also
reject the well-known practitioner saying that "a bad settlement is better than a
good trial. 132
These objectives must be promoted without weakening the attorneys'
incentives to search for violations and file class actions against violators. A
system that excessively raises the attorneys' opportunity costs or makes their
removal from the class-attomey position too easy undercuts those incentives to
the class members' detriment.
A. Auctioning for Loyalty
We propose to establish the following set of rules that has three interrelated
components: auction, fee forfeiture and a ban on inadequate settlements.
1. Auction
Under this provision, the class action would be taken over and prosecuted
by an attorney (or a group of attorneys) willing to sue the defendant for the
highest amount of money. This would require the attorneys participating in the
auction to state the total amount of money to be sued for on behalf of the class
members. This stated amount would bind the class attorney only. This amount
would not bind the class members or the court, so the court would be
authorized to award in its verdict any recovery it deems fit.133 To prevent free-
riding on the part of competing attorneys, the auction conditions would require
that all offers be submitted at the same time in sealed envelopes.
2. Fee Forfeiture
Under this provision, the class attorney would be denied her fee if her
auction offer is ultimately found unreasonably exaggerated. An unreasonably
exaggerated offer would be identified by the shortfall between the sued-for and
the recovered amounts and by the existence of a more realistic offer that came
critique of settlements, see Owen Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 YALE L.J. 1073 (1984) (arguing against
institutionalization of settlements and reproaching them for generating inequities and perpetuating
injustice); and Jules Coleman & Charles Silver, Justice in Settlements, SOC. PHIL. & POL'Y, Autumn
1986, at 103 (arguing that settlements erode the quality ofjustice).
132. See, e.g., In re Warner Communications Sec. Litig., 618 F. Supp. 735, 740 (S.D.N.Y. 1985),
aff'd, 798 F.2d 35 (2d Cir. 1986) (approvingly quoting the saying "A bad settlement is almost always
better than a good trial").
133. As explained at the outset, the class action's stated amount would function as a settlement-
floor for class attorneys, not as a verdict-ceiling for judges and juries. Whenever appropriate, judges
should also instruct jurors about it.
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from another participant in the auction. The test for unreasonableness would be
rigorous: the court would compare the attorney's initially sued-for amount with
those offered by other attorneys in the auction. If one of those attorneys offered
an amount closer to the plaintiffs' award, the class attorney would then be
denied her fee.
3. Banning Inadequate Settlements
1 34
Under this provision, the court will categorically decline to approve a
settlement that does not yield the class members the sued-for (or a greater)
amount of recovery.'
35
Our following discussion expounds the operation of this mechanism as
eliminating the class action agency problem. Throughout this discussion, we
assume that the attorney's fee (including reimbursement for expenses) is fixed
as a flat percentage from the plaintiffs' recovery. The court will determine this
percentage prior to conducting the auction. Alternatively, each participant in
the auction may state her proposed fee in the offer, and the court will deduct it
from the stated amount of the action. Consequently, the attorney promising the
class members the highest recovery amount will win the auction. 136
B. The Defendant's Incentives
Under the proposed model, the defendant's settlement-related incentives
are straightforward. The defendant would settle the lawsuit only if its stated
amount equals his estimation of his expected liability. He would thus be willing
to pay this basic amount to the class members and their attorney. The defendant
may add to this basic amount an additional sum that derives from his saving of
litigation costs. He would, of course, prefer to save those costs in their entirety,
but may also be satisfied by saving a fraction of those costs.
134. Professor Jesse Fried suggested to us that we replace this provision by a fully secret auction
arrangement, under which the auction bids would remain secret until the end of the litigation. Arguably,
this would induce the selected class attorney to zealously promote the class members' interests. This
proposal is more elegant, but is also less tight than the settlement-ban component of our model. We
discuss it below in the text. See also TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 11, at 745-56 ("sealed bids would
seem to be a prerequisite for the integrity of any auction"; in those cases in which "class members have
a legitimate interest in seeing the winning bid.., there is no reason ... why they should not be afforded
access to it, under an appropriate protective order and without disclosure to the defendant").
135. See Mars Steel Corp. v. Continental I11. Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 834 F.2d 677, 682 (7th Cir.
1987) (holding that "a settlement is fair to the plaintiffs in a substantive sense ... if it gives them the
expected value of their claim if it went to trial, net of the costs of trial"). This holding evidences a
judicial presumption against settlements not satisfying the expected value standard. We propose to make
this presumption irrebuttable.
136. If a policy-maker prefers deterrence of wrongdoers over compensation of victims, she may
provide that the attorney undertaking to sue the defendant for the highest possible amount will win the
auction. The fee proposed by that attorney would then be irrelevant.
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There would be no settlement, however, if the lawsuit was filed for an
exaggerated amount. For obvious reasons, the defendant would not be prepared
to pay the lawsuit's stated amount. The only amount the defendant would be
prepared to pay is the sum that reflects his estimation of his expected liability.
The defendant, however, would be unable to settle for this amount even when
the class attorney agrees to that settlement: the court would not approve any
settlement below the stated amount.
This foreclosure serves an important function. In its absence, the defendant
would still have a strong incentive to strike a collusive settlement with the class
attorney. Take, for example, an attorney who won the auction by offering to
sue the defendant for $10 million with a runner-up attorney offering to file the
class action for just $5 million. Let it also be assumed that the winning offer
and the ensuing class action for $10 million are based on a realistic assessment
of the expected return. In this case, the class attorney and the defendant may
collusively settle the action for $8 million. If they do so, the class attorney
would gain a large fee that would not be subject to forfeiture (because the
runner-up offer was more distant than her offer from the amount actually
recovered by the class members). The settlement ban would therefore be
necessary for preventing such a settlement.
C. The Class Attorney's Incentives
Under the proposed model, an attorney would win the auction and obtain
control over the class action by offering to sue the defendant for the highest
amount of damages. No attorney, however, would offer to file a lawsuit for an
unrealistically high amount in order to win the auction (a possibility that could
be particularly attractive for attorneys with low opportunity costs, as well as for
those who seek to gain publicity through participation in a high-profile
litigation). Such opportunistic offers would not be submitted for two reasons:
the inevitability of the final judgment and the fee forfeiture. Under the auction
provision, the sued amount is fixed by the winning offer and cannot be changed
during the trial. In conjunction with the settlement-ban provision, this
commitment eliminates the possibility that the class attorney and the defendant
will strike a collusive settlement after the auction. Because the settlement
possibility has been translucently ruled out, an attorney who contemplates
submission of an opportunistically high offer knows that the ensuing lawsuit
would always go to trial, with the judgment on the merits being inevitable. The
attorney also knows that the judgment would award the class members much
less than the filed amount, so she would lose her proximity-of-recovery contest
with the runner-up bidder. Consequently, the attorney would be denied her fee
under the fee-forfeiture provision. This prospect would be discouraging even
for those attorneys who have relatively low opportunity costs and who are
therefore willing to take up a class action without being able to settle it out of
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court.
This analysis may suggest a possible replacement for our settlement-ban
provision. This provision can seemingly be replaced by a fully secret auction
arrangement, under which the auction bids would remain secret until the end of
the litigation.137 Arguably, this would induce the selected class attorney to
zealously pursue the class members' interests. Unaware of the bids made by
her former competitors in the auction, the class attorney would be unable to
eliminate the rational fear of losing her fee under the fee-forfeiture provision.
Consequently, she would make every effort to secure the highest amount of
recovery for the class members by bringing this amount-by litigation or
through a settlement-as close as possible to her filed amount.
In our opinion, the settlement-ban provision would still provide a tighter
solution to the problem. Under the fully secret auction arrangement, an attorney
who prevailed in the auction might still bribe other attorneys by promising
them a fraction of her fee in exchange for the information about their bids. This
bribing possibility may be counteracted by appropriate ethical or even criminal
prohibitions, as well as by the prospect of holdout and extortion.138 Yet the
chances of detecting a violation of such prohibitions are remarkably small. For
this reason, we prefer the settlement-ban provision over the fully secret auction
arrangement. This preference, however, is not strong enough to rule out the
fully secret auction arrangement.
D. Corrective Measures
The unreasonableness proviso introduces a relaxation into our fee-forfeiture
provision in order not to exert chilling effects on potential class attorneys.
Litigation outcomes are difficult to forecast. Attorneys and judges may form
divergent assessments of those outcomes. The prospect of losing the fee by
suing for an amount that exceeds the sum ultimately recovered by the class
members may, therefore, be too threatening for many attorneys. As a result,
fewer attorneys would attempt to investigate violations and file class actions.
The fact that some attorneys are risk-averse would further intensify this
reluctance.1
39
To the extent that this prospect is real, its deleterious effects must be
137. See Auction Houses, 197 F.R.D. at 74, 84 (ordering a secret-bid auction for class attorney
services).
138. See supra note 48 and accompanying text.
139. Generally, risk-aversion among prospective class attorneys is not a factor that should affect
the formulation of class action rules. Up to a certain level, class attorneys are paid for being risk-neutral:
rules regulating their fees account for the litigation risks that they assume. See, e.g., TASK FORCE
REPORT, supra note 11, at 706. Furthermore, an attorney is free to demand a higher fee if she is averse
toward risk. Ultimately, the forces of supply and demand operating in the market will determine the fee
that class members will pay (together with their attorney's identity).
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counteracted by corrective measures. The unreasonableness proviso is one such
measure. Under this proviso, a class attorney would not forfeit her fee just by
winning a lesser amount than originally filed, as would happen under the
Auction Houses formulae for attorney auctions. The court would have to
compare the amount originally filed with the parallel amounts offered by other
attorneys in the auction. The class attorney would thus be denied her fee only if
one of those amounts came closer to the sum ultimately awarded by the court.
She should indeed suffer that penalty because she filed an unreasonably high
demand which enabled her to improperly overtake a more suitable attorney in
the contest for control over the class action. Conscientious attorneys with
adequate professional skills consequently would not be discouraged from filing
and prosecuting class actions.
In some cases, the runner-up offer in the auction would only be slightly
below the attorney's winning bid. As a result, if the defendant's settlement
proposal comes near that offer, the class attorney might not be able to accept
the proposal. The defendant's proposal may be reasonable, but the attorney
would turn it down if accepting it entails her loss of the proximity-of-recovery
contest and the corresponding loss of her fee. In any such case, the class
attorney would ask the defendant to slightly increase the settlement amount,
which would not be an unreasonable demand, given the proximity of the two
amounts and the trial expenses that the defendant would be willing to save. The
attorney may also contract to sacrifice part of her fee in order to increase the
amount that the class members would recover. 140 The class members' interests
would thus be adequately protected.
Another corrective measure featured by our model is even more significant.
Any chilling effect that might be exerted upon prospective class attorneys by
the fee-forfeiture provision may always be offset by fee-raising. To counteract
such chilling effects, courts may raise class attorneys' fees to a higher
percentage level. The required fee raise should correspond to the increase in the
risk to which the fee-forfeiture provision exposes prospective class attorneys.
This corrective measure would attract more skillful and experienced attorneys,
whose work as class representatives would produce greater benefits for the
class members.
During the course of litigation, the class attorney may come across new
information that was not available at discovery that preceded the auction. 141
Based on that information, the attorney may find out that her auction bid was
overly optimistic. In this scenario, the amount of recovery that the attorney
finds herself able to obtain for her clients falls far below her stated amount, so
140. Indeed, opening these possibilities to the class attorney is yet another reason for preferring our
settlement-ban proposal over fully secret auctions.
141. In our subsequent discussion, we offer a pre-auction discovery mechanism that reduces this
possibility to the extent feasible. See infra Part VI.
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the attorney is going to lose the proximity-of-recovery contest along with her
fee, regardless of whether she settles the case out of court or litigates it through
to the final judgment. At the auction stage, this scenario was as likely as the
opposite scenario in which the attorney's bid turns out to be overly pessimistic.
Indeed, at that stage there is no reason to believe that information which is yet
to become known will be systematically slanted in a particular way. At the
auction stage, therefore, the probabilities of such optimistic and pessimistic
scenarios are equal. This, however, is not the case with the expected returns
that the auction bidders must affiliate to those probabilities: a bid that turns out
overly optimistic risks the attorney's fee, a risk that pessimistic bids do not
entail. Consequently, the attorneys would have to reduce their filing offers, and
this downward adjustment of the bids seemingly damages the suing class.
We believe that this danger is unreal. First, the attorneys' competition
would place limits on that adjustment. Eager to win the auction, the competing
attorneys would attempt to outbid their competitors by offering to sue the
defendant for the highest possible amount. Second, attorneys who run
portfolios of cases (including class actions) would not steeply reduce their
filing offers. Instead, they would diversify the risk by working on the correct
assumption that new information will damage them in one case, but will benefit
them in the other. Third, raising the percentage of the attorneys' fee would
further offset the downward adjustment danger.
One should, however, consider another relevant danger that we have
already mentioned in connection with the Auction Houses formulae: after
discovering her inevitable fee-loss, the class attorney would discontinue her
resource investment in the case. From her perspective, bringing her clients an
amount of recovery that goes below the amount originally filed is both as good
and as bad as bringing them a zero amount. The attorney's reputational
concerns may soften this cynical thought, but would still fail to secure the class
members' adequate representation. The attorney therefore clearly needs a better
incentive for further expending her opportunity costs on her clients' case.
Authorizing courts to remunerate such attorneys on exceptional grounds is
one possible way of setting such an incentive. To obtain this exceptional
remuneration, the attorney would have to convince the court that the amount of
recovery that she brings to her clients is reasonable, and that the higher amount,
originally stated in her winning bid, originated from an honest miscalculation
which she could not practically prevent because of the scarcity of information
that existed at the time of the auction. In other words, the attorney would have
to convince the court that the new information that became available only at the
trial could not reasonably be obtained prior to the auction. To pass this
threshold, the attorney would have to demonstrate by a preponderance of the
evidence that other auction participants also did not have this information. If
Yale Law & Policy Review
she succeeds in doing so, the court would award her a fee in the amount that it
deems equitable under the circumstances. Normally, the court would reduce the
attorney's original fee in order to strengthen the attorneys' incentive to seek
information before the auction.
Admittedly, this discretion might dilute the importance of the proximity-of-
recovery contest and correspondingly inflate the attorneys' bids at the auction.
We therefore move from rewards to punishments and recommend a
supplemental incentive for counteracting both the attorney's shirking
temptation and her reliance on the court as a potential rescuer of her fee. Future
exclusion from similar auctions and, correspondingly, from class representation
is the incentive that we recommend. If an attorney delivers her clients a
recovery amount that goes far below her filed amount, judges should abstain
from appointing her as a class attorney in future cases for a certain period. The
excluded attorney would consequently be unable to generate earnings from
class actions. Moreover, because the exclusion would adversely affect the
attorney's portfolio of contingent-fee cases, the attorney's ability to diversify
her litigation risks would also be diluted. These prospects would induce the
attorney to overcome her fee-related frustration and to zealously prosecute the
class action.
Indeed, because no attorney has a vested right to represent class action
clients who did not hire her personally, judges are authorized to conduct a pre-
auction screening of prospective class counsel. 142 Note that information about
class counsel performance is readily available to judges and attorneys. Both
legal and business communities maintain efficient communication channels
through frequent publications, such as New York Law Journal, Wall Street
Journal, and other periodicals. These publications report about class actions
and often comment on the attorneys' performance. 43 Judges may further
enhance this communication by commenting on the class attorney's
performance in their decisions, disseminated by both law reports and the
professional databases, such as LEXIS and Westlaw. 144 Judges may also
supplement this market mechanism with an attractive alternative. Their auction
conditions may provide, for example, that for every 10% shortfall between the
filed and the recovered amounts the attorney will be excluded from similar
auctions for a specified period. The attorney would consequently attempt to
shorten her future exclusion period by maximizing the amount of the class
142. The Auction Houses court conducted such screening of attorneys. See Auction Houses, 197
F.R.D. at 72-74; See also In re Lucent Techs., Inc., Sec. Litig. 194 F.R.D. 137, 157 (D.N.J. 2000); In re
Oracle Sec. Litig., 132 F.R.D. 542 (N.D. Cal. 1990).
143. See, e.g., Hamblett, supra note 96; Coffee, supra note 98.
144. Cf Edward B. Rock, Saints And Sinners: How Does Delaware Corporate Law Work?, 44
UCLA L. REV. 1009, 1063-72 (1997) (demonstrating that professional publications efficaciously
channel information about corporate officials' performance within both corporate and legal
communities).
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members' recovery. As already explained, there is a good reason for letting the
attorney sustain the consequent loss. This attorney prevailed in the auction after
defeating a better assessor of the class action. Therefore, this attorney was not
the best attorney to represent the plaintiffs and her selection frustrated the
auction's purpose.145
To intensify the competition amongst prospective class attorneys, judges
may also require that an appropriate public announcement be made prior to the
auction. Such announcements might attract more attorneys to participate in the
auction. For obvious reasons, an addition of auction participants would result in
a bidding process more beneficial for the suing class.
E. Who Wins the Auction?
For reasons articulated above, offers tendered by attorneys participating in
the auction would coincide with the attorneys' genuine estimations of the
lawsuit's expected return. This basic sum would be determined by the lawsuit's
stakes, multiplied by its probability of success. By offering to file a lawsuit for
a lesser amount, the attorney would expose herself to a substantial risk of
defeat in the auction. If she offers to sue for an exaggerated amount, then, for
reasons already given, she might win the auction, but she would lose her fee.
The attorney would therefore base her auction offer on the lawsuit's expected
return, as she calculated it by using her best professional judgment. The
attorney would only be able to increase this basic sum by an additional amount
that reflects the defendant's litigation costs. She might find this adjustment
attractive in the expectation that the defendant would still be willing to settle
the case in order to save part of those costs. However, because these incentives
are public knowledge, every attorney participating in the auction would act
similarly. Therefore, the adjustment of our attorney's offer would not increase
her chances of winning the auction.
The auction therefore cannot be won opportunistically: an attorney can win
it only on the grounds that genuinely reflect her appraisal of the lawsuit's
expected return. Any such attorney would calculate this sum by multiplying her
genuinely estimated full value of the lawsuit by her genuinely estimated
probability of success. Nor is it possible for a prospective class attorney to
strike a collusive settlement with the defendant prior to the auction. If such an
attorney subsequently offers a low lawsuit amount, she would then be
overtaken by another attorney, so the collusive settlement would not be
145. Arguably, this corrective measure could also improve the auction that took place in Auction
Houses. This improvement, however, would only be possible if the court based the attorney's loss of her
fee on the outcome of the proximity-of-recovery contest. Any other criterion for fee forfeiture would be
arbitrary or otherwise problematic. If the court decided to conduct the proximity-of-recovery contest
amongst competing attorneys, its auction would then become similar to ours.
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implemented. If she offers an exaggerated lawsuit amount in order to win the
auction and assume control over the class action, she would then be committed
to that amount, which would preclude the possibility of a settlement and force
judgment on the merits onto the parties concerned. 146 In accordance with the
fee-forfeiture provision, this judgment might also deny the attorney her fee.
Our model therefore precludes the scenario in which an incompetent and
disloyal attorney wins the class counsel auction and subsequently delivers a
poor representation to her clients. This morbid scenario was one of the
principal reasons that supported the Task Force's skeptical report on class
counsel auctions. 147 The problem faced by the court in appointing class counsel
parallels the problem encountered by employers in recruiting employees. In
both cases, the right appointment depends on each candidate's competence and
loyalty, but the information about these qualities is not publicly observable and
verifiable. This information is hidden or "private": 148 each candidate is
privately informed about her professional qualities, but this information is both
unobservable and unverifiable because low-quality candidates pool with better
candidates and do not reveal this information. Therefore, the problem that
arises here is that of asymmetric information. 149 The informational asymmetry
that exists between the court and the class members, on the one side, and each
candidate for the class counsel position, on the other side, creates an
opportunity for lying and cheating. Unscrupulous and incompetent attorneys
may exploit this opportunity to seize the class counsel position.
Our model precludes false signaling by competing attorneys by screening
out the disloyal and incompetent bids. There is only one type of attorney that
can win our auction: an attorney who conscientiously estimated the class
members' expected recovery, offered them a competitive fee, and pledged her
earnings from the case as a security for her undertaking to provide her clients a
both loyal and competent representation. All other attorneys would either be
defeated in the auction or forfeit their earnings from the case. Because both of
these prospects lie within the bidding attorneys' contemplation, unscrupulous
and incompetent attorneys would have no incentive to participate in the
auction. Our model thus guarantees a both loyal and professionally adequate
representation of class members. This model emulates the rational process by
which a single and reasonably informed owner of a lawsuit hires an attorney in
a free market and secures loyal and competent representation by that attorney.
146. The defendant may also bribe the class attorney to induce her to betray her clients at trial. As
already mentioned, our model does not eliminate such criminal possibilities, leaving this job to the
appropriate criminal sanctions, to disciplinary measures, such as disbarment, and to the economic
incentives that include holdouts and extortions. See supra note 48 and accompanying text.
147. See TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 11, at 46, 734, 738-9
148. See generally IAN MOLHO, THE ECONOMICS OF INFORMATION: LYING AND CHEATING IN
MARKETS AND ORGANIZATIONS (1997).
149. Seeid.at 1-10.
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But what about the attorney qualities that go beyond loyalty and basic
competency? Admittedly, selecting the .best attorney amongst candidates
already screened for both loyalty and professionalism often proves to be a
formidable task. Beyond this basic screening, our model offers only one
criterion for such selection: a competition between the attorneys' net recovery
undertakings for class members.. This criterion is not perfect, but it seems to be
the only one available. At the very least, our model guarantees class members a
medium-quality combination of loyalty and professionalism. All other means
of selecting class counsel do not even guarantee that.
F. Eliminating the Conflict-of-Interests Differential
Our model affects the class attorney's opportunity costs (as defined above)
in a way that eliminates the minimum conflict-of-interests differential, indexed
as C(1 -j)/f To repeat: this differential originates from the attorney's presently
existing incentive to settle the case without litigating it, as long as the
settlement yields her a fee equal to (or greater than) jPR - C.150 The attorney
would thus settle the case for any amount equal to (or greater than) PR - C/f
The class members would then recover (1 -J) x (PR - C/f), as opposed to their
expected recovery amount PR(I - J). The difference between these two
amounts--denoted as C(1 - J)/f-is the conflict-of-interests differential that
needs to be eliminated.
The attorney's search and preparation efforts, together with other costs
already expended in connection with the lawsuit, are sunk costs that already
equal zero. As for the attorney's other costs, their fate would depend on
whether the case is settled or tried. Under our model's conditions, the case can
only be settled when the settlement amount equals the expected return from the
lawsuit (PR). This would also be the filed amount, to which the attorney
committed herself at the auction. The attorney would therefore be unable to
settle the case, to her clients' detriment, for PR - C/f in order to gain JPR - C
without litigating the case. If she did so, her fee would be subject to forfeiture.
This means that the attorney irrevocably committed herself to not sacrificing
the sum of C/f that belongs to her clients, in order to induce the defendant to
settle. Absent that inducement, the defendant would have to decide whether to
settle the case by paying the class members PR or go to trial. Other possibilities
are not open to the defendant.
This framework of rules and incentives places the class attorney's
opportunity costs outside her control. These costs are pledged for the benefit of
150. To recall: in this formula, P denotes the probability of the lawsuit's success; R denotes the full
amount of money to be recovered by the class members if the lawsuit succeeds;f denotes the attorney's
share in the action (that is, her contingent fee); and C denotes the attorney's opportunity costs.
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the class members, and it is only the defendant who can remove this pledge by
paying the class members the expected value of their lawsuit as a minimum
settlement amount. The defendant may also decide not to pay this amount,
which would force the class attorney to expend her opportunity costs on the
ensuing litigation. In the first scenario, the class members would receive
(1 -])PR and the attorney would gainfPR. The conflict-of-interests differential
would thus disappear due to the defendant's decision to save the class
attorney's opportunity costs. Formally, when the settlement prospect is
assessed from the class attorney's perspective, this implies that C = 0. In the
second scenario, the defendant's decision to litigate bums out the attorney's
opportunity costs. Formally, this prospect also implies that C = 0 because those
costs will unavoidably sink. At any stage in the proceeding, the class attorney's
opportunity costs which are not yet sunk would thus either sink or be saved in
their entirety, depending on what the defendant-not the class attorney-
decides to do. For that reason, these costs would always equal zero in the
attorney's settlement calculation; and because C = 0, the conflict-of-interests
differential-C(1 -f)/f-would also equal zero.
In this way, our model eliminates the first type of collusion that exploits the
minimum conflict-of-interests differential by allowing the class counsel to
acquire a share in the action without paying for it with her opportunity costs.
Previous attempts at resolving the same problem undertook a more
comprehensive and consequently more ambitious task: their objective is to
align the interests of the class counsel with those of the class members.
Formally, a successful implementation of this objective would guarantee that
f= 1. If this project were to succeed, the conflict-of-interests differential would
also fade away. Furthermore, the success of this project would eliminate the
opportunity for the second type of collusion, since there would be no incentive
for the class counsel to enlarge her share in the action through reduction of her
clients' share. However, this apparent advantage of thef= 1 project turns out to
be a disadvantage. This project is too ambitious and therefore unlikely to be
successfully implemented in practice. The specific shortcomings of this
project's various offshoots have been outlined in our preceding discussion.
Our set of rules would also foreclose the second type of collusion. The
auction provision publicly affixes the lawsuit its highest market value. The fee-
forfeiture provision commits the selected class attorney to this publicly stated
amount. The settlement-ban provision prevents the defendant and the class
attorney from striking a settlement that would reduce this amount. The
defendant would thus be unable to assist the class attorney in executing her
self-seeking plans. Under the already existing class action rules, the class
attorney's share in the lawsuit (/) is subject to the court's approval and is
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therefore translucent. 5' The class members' share in the lawsuit can therefore
no longer be embezzled by a collusive settlement.
G. The Likelihood of a Settlement
Promotion of settlements is yet another feature of the proposed model. This
model would increase the settlement rate by motivating both the class attorney
and the defendant to correctly evaluate the expected value of the lawsuit. If the
attorney who prevails in the auction correctly determines the lawsuit's expected
return and subsequently sues the defendant for that amount, the defendant may
or may not offer her a settlement. If the defendant's estimation of the lawsuit's
expected return is similar or close to that of the attorney, settlement would
become virtually inevitable. The defendant would then simply offer the
attorney to settle the case for the sued amount. From the defendant's viewpoint,
such a settlement would be obviously attractive: by entering into it he would
save his litigation costs. The defendant would thus remove the threat posed by
the class action and purchase the resjudicata protection from future lawsuits at
the lowest possible price. If the defendant's estimation of the lawsuit's
expected return substantially differs from that of the class attorney, the case
would go to trial. This prospect would entail considerable risks for both the
class attorney and the defendant. The class attorney would risk losing her fee,
which would impel her to zealously prosecute the lawsuit. The defendant, in
turn, would face an unremovable threat of being defeated at trial, which entails
substantial losses. The class attorney and the defendant would therefore seek
common ground. They can therefore be expected to cooperate in order to
reduce the extent of the asymmetric information and strategic bargaining
problems as impediments to a settlement. 1
52
After the auction, however, this cooperation might be unfruitful, since the
class attorney would have already committed herself to the sued amount by
making a unilateral estimation of the lawsuit's expected return, with which the
defendant may rationally disagree. It would therefore be more rational for a
prospective defendant to negotiate a settlement before the auction in order to
initiate a class action settlement proceeding in collaboration with the class
attorney. 153 Any such negotiation and the ensuing settlement would, of course,
be conditional on the auction's outcome, since the settlement offer jointly made
by the defendant and the cooperating attorney might still be overbid by another
attorney participating in the auction. The defendant and the cooperating
151. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(e); NEWBERG & CONTE, supra note 53.
152. Cf Miller, supra note 130, at 26-28 (arguing that reducing the parties' optimism is essential
for attainment of efficient settlements).
153. See, e.g., Coffee, supra note 46, at 1378-82 (describing and criticizing the class action
settlement practices in the area of mass torts).
Yale Law & Policy Review
attorney would therefore attempt to agree on a settlement amount that would
defeat other offers in the auction. If they agree on such an amount, and if their
joint offer subsequently defeats other offers at the auction, the resulting
settlement would then adequately reflect the class action's expected return.
This would guarantee adequate compensation for the class members.
Moreover, a considerable amount of litigation expenses would be saved and
dockets would be cleared. The proposed model therefore not only resolves the
class action agency problem, but also promotes general efficiency in the
resolution of class action disputes.
VI. THE DISCOVERY MECHANISM
Our model would produce the desired effects only if courts supplement it
with an efficient mechanism for pretrial discovery. Without such a mechanism,
prospective class attorneys would hardly be able to estimate the expected return
of the lawsuit. Many attorneys would consequently decide not to search for and
prosecute violations, and those who would still be willing to do so would base
their auction offers on a fair amount of guesswork. Under the existing
discovery doctrine, courts may enable prospective class attorneys to conduct
the required discovery.154 However, under our model's set of rules, none of the
attorneys would have a strong enough incentive for conducting comprehensive
discovery. Class action discovery is a costly proceeding that requires
substantial time and effort. Few attorneys (if any) would be willing to incur the
costs of this proceeding before securing their appointment as class counsel. The
"winner's curse" problem, to which we refer earlier in this Article,' further
intensifies the attorneys' reluctance to invest in discovery.
Furthermore, since no attorney would acquire a proprietary interest in the
information that she would produce through discovery, the well-known
common pool problem would emerge. Each of the attorneys would contemplate
free-riding on the information generated by others, and she would also
anticipate that other attorneys would take a free ride on the information that she
would produce. In equilibrium, therefore, none of the attorneys would engage
in producing the relevant information. This danger further strengthens the case
for a collectivized mechanism of discovery.
For these reasons, we propose to appoint an attorney not participating in the
auction as a discovery master. 156 This master and the attorney who prevails in
154. See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(a).
155. See supra note 59 and accompanying text.
156. Rule 53 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure authorizes appointment of such masters. See
supra note 30. Because the master would economize the class members' discovery expenses, utility and
fairness both justify its engagement in class actions. Note that, in litigation, discovery expenses are
inevitable, as opposed, for example, to the costs that Alon Klement offers to expend on the monitoring
of class attorneys. See Klement, supra note 25.
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the auction would have to commit themselves in advance to the following set
of rules. The master will conduct the discovery and subsequently sell its
products, for an agreed price, to the attorney who won the auction. Before this
transaction, the discovery products will be available to each attorney
participating in the auction. Every auction participant will thus be able to base
her filing offer on the information obtained through discovery (in addition to
the information that she obtained independently). If the master and the auction
winner fail to reach an agreement concerning the discovery products' price, the
court will determine that price at a special hearing. Because discovery is an
essential legal practitioner's job, one can expect professional judges to
adequately assess its value. Alternatively, the court will determine that price
and keep it unannounced until the master and the auction winner submit their
offered prices in sealed envelopes. The court will then open the envelopes, and
the sum that comes closer to that of the court will be the price for which the
auction winner will purchase the discovery products from the master. 157
This set of rules prevents both overpricing and under-pricing of the
discovery products. Under this set of rules, the master will submit to the court
his highest price that approximates the judge's anticipated valuation of the
products. The attorney, in turn, will submit her lowest price that approximates
the same valuation. Because the attorney and the master will compete with
each other over the proximity of their respective prices to the judge's
anticipated valuation, the attorney will submit her maximal purchasing price,
while the master will offer his minimal selling price. The two prices will thus
come close to each other, and the judge's valuation will identify the price that
is more reasonable than the other.
The master will consequently have an adequate incentive for conducting
comprehensive discovery. To obtain future engagements, the master will also
be keen to establish a reputation for his work as both thorough and reasonably
priced. In turn, each of the auction participants will have an adequate incentive
for winning the auction in order to represent the suing class. Each of them will
submit her auction bid subject to an assurance that the price for the discovery
products will be reasonable. 
158
157. Arbitrators successfully used this method in resolving the Baseball League salary disputes.
See, e.g., Jason Micah Ross, Note, "Baseball Litigation ": A New Calculus for Awarding Damages in
Tort Trials, 78 TEX. L. REV. 439, 448-50 (1999) (presenting and discussing the baseball arbitration
method).
158. Professor Lisa Bernstein suggested that we examine the possibility of allowing the discovery
master to sell his products to the highest bidder in a separate auction. That bidder would subsequently be
able to use these products if she also won the main auction. If that bidder did not win the main auction,
she would sell the products to the attorney who won it. The given set of rules would allow the winner of
the main auction to use the discovery products only after purchasing them. Seemingly, this framework
would create optimal incentives for pretrial discovery.
However, this possibility is problematic. One of the participants in the auction for discovery
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VII. CLASS COHESION AND INTRACLASS CONFLICTS
No class action mechanism would operate fairly and efficiently if a single
attorney or a group of attorneys' 59 were allowed to represent diverse groups of
claimants with conflicting interests. If obtaining a benefit for one group of
claimants entails a disadvantage for another group, an attorney representing
both groups would act under a conflict of interests.' Such an attorney would
therefore be unable to promote the interests of all her clients both fairly and
efficiently. To eliminate intraclass conflicts, courts have to divide
heterogeneous groups of claimants into homogeneous subclasses. Under the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, class certification inquiry is a procedural
device by which courts perform the required division. 16 Subclassing, however,
also entails a danger for the class action's economy of scale. As Professor
Coffee observes,
If subclassing is required for each material legal or economic difference that
distinguishes class members, the Balkanization of the class action is threatened.
Such a fragmented class might be unmanageable, certainly would reduce the
economic incentives for legal entrepreneurs to act as private attorneys general, and
products may decide to outbid others strategically in order to make the subsequent purchase of the
products unattractive. Because the products' price might be too high for the winner of the main auction,
this winner might decide not to represent the suing class. Consequently, the purchaser of the discovery
products would acquire control over the class action and subsequently use it to her advantage. Thus, if
she is prepared to earn a lesser fee, she would attempt to strike an early settlement with the defendant at
the expense of the suing class. By suing the defendant for a lesser amount, previously stated in her main
auction offer, this attorney would be able to escape the fee-forfeiture provision. An attempt to resolve
this problem by requiring the discovery products' purchaser to file the action for the amount offered by
the winner of the main auction would create another difficulty. Attorneys participating in the auction for
discovery products would face the prospect of losing money (due to their inability to sell the products
for their full price to the selected class attorney or, alternatively, due to their involvement in a non-
profitable class action). The attorneys would therefore reduce their bids. Anticipating this reduction, the
discovery master would reduce his efforts. The quality of discovery products would consequently be
reduced to the detriment of the suing class.
159. A group of attorneys would also include counsel who represent different claimants, but pool
their fees. See Coffee, supra note 25, at 398 (noting that "subclassing as a remedy for class action
collusion may accomplish little if plaintiffs' attorneys for different subclasses could by pooling their
fees effectively cancel the incentives that the law means to create for them to zealously represent their
clients").
160. See generally Deborah L. Rhode, Class Conflicts in Class Actions, 34 STAN L. REV. 1183
(1982).
161. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(4)(B). The Supreme Court's recent jurisprudence indeed underscores
judicial vigilance in detecting manipulated definitions of the class. See Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor,
521 U.S. 591 (1997) (requiring subclassing of mass tort plaintiffs with conflicting interests and striking
down an otherwise fair settlement); Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815 (1999) (applying the same
principle and striking down a settlement in a limited-fund class action proceeding). For discussion of
these decisions see Issacharoff, supra note 60 (criticizing both Amchem and Ortiz for their rule-
formalism and offering to tackle conflicts of interests that arise in class actions by legitimate governance
standards); George M. Cohen, The "Fair" Is the Enemy of the Good- Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corporation
and Class Action Settlements, 8 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 23 (2000) (observing that the Ortiz decision was
correct as a matter of formal legal principle, but insufficiently sensitive to pragmatic concerns). See also
Susan P. Koniak, Feasting While the Widow Weeps: Georgine v. Amchem Products, Inc., 80 CORNELL
L. REV. 1045, 1051-86 (1995) (demonstrating how class attorneys may gerrymander the class to
augment their private profits).
Auctioning for Loyalty
could be extremely difficult to settle if each subclass (and its attorney) had an
incentive to hold out for more.
162
Our model features no explicit mechanism for securing class cohesion and
for eliminating intraclass conflicts. Yet, it does offer a competitive environment
that would facilitate class certification inquiries. In that environment, courts
would be able to conduct such inquiries after the discovery and before the
auction. At this stage, information obtained through discovery would be
supplemented by the information that each competing attorney would provide
in order to prevail over her competitors in the subsequent auction. This
proceeding would take place under the court-imposed rule that prohibits
representation of heterogeneous classes by a single attorney or by a group of
attorneys. For obvious reasons, each attorney participating in this proceeding
would be interested in increasing her chances of winning the subsequent
auction. Each attorney would therefore be interested in any subclassing that
would be economically attractive from her perspective. Any such subclassing
would both increase the number of auctions in which she can participate and
decrease the number of competitors that could prevail in those auctions. The
attorney's chances of winning one of those auctions would consequently
increase.
This proceeding would also generate information that individual claimants
would subsequently be able to use as a basis for their participation in the class
action. Individual claimants would also be able to utilize that information in
deciding about opting out from the action and hiring their own counsel. The
proposed proceeding would therefore fortify the class members' right to both
"voice" and "exit," which, in turn, would produce greater loyalty on the part of
class attorneys. This proceeding would thus promote the "voice," "exit," and
"loyalty" objectives that two class-action experts, Professor Coffee and
Professor Issacharoff, have recommended in their recent articles.' 63
Finally, attorneys representing any existing claimant must not be allowed to
participate in the auction. Auction competitors should therefore be required to
certify their non-engagement in any existing or future representation of any
claimant eligible for joining the class action. This strict condition for
participating in the auction is necessary for our model's proper operation.
Alternatively, courts would be required to evaluate any potential conflicts of
interests on a case-by-case basis.164
162. See Coffee, supra note 25, at 398.
163. See id.; Issacharoff, supra note 60, at 366-80.
164. Cf. Samuel Issacharoff, Class Action Conflicts, 30 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 805, 832-33 (1997)
(advocating, inter alia, "a strong presumption against class certification in which plaintiffs' counsel are
able to unload an inventory of preexisting cases [and] against class certification in any type of case in
which there are preexisting contractual relationships between plaintiffs' counsel and one segment or
section of the proposed class and no preexisting contractual relationship between the plaintiffs' counsel
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VIII. CONCLUSION
Class action was designed to empower individual victims harmed by
formidable corporate power. Under this mechanism, plaintiffs give up control
over their lawsuits, theoretically, in exchange for guaranteeing their substantive
rights. This mechanism, however, gives class attorneys an ample opportunity to
earn their fees without expending much time and effort on behalf of their
clients. Moreover, corporate wrongdoers and unscrupulous class counsel may
enter into collusive settlements that deprive plaintiffs of their just remedies. In
addition to causing obvious injustice to the victims, such settlements are
economically inefficient. Under such settlements, corporations would pay too
little for the harms they inflict and, consequently, would invest sub-optimally
in precautions.
Our analysis of the class action agency problem has identified two distinct
paradigms within which the available solutions to that problem fall. Under the
Ownership paradigm, the class attorney becomes the master of the action.
Under the Servantship paradigm, the attorney is closely monitored by
competitive market and other mechanisms, carefully designed to eradicate the
conflict of interests between the attorney and the suing class. After
demonstrating the failure of the Ownership paradigm, we have proposed a new
solution to the problem. The proposed solution falls into the Servantship
paradigm. This solution consists of three rules: auction, fee forfeiture and a ban
on inadequate settlements. We have demonstrated that the synergetic working
of these rules guarantees both economic efficiency and justice to the individual
victims.
and another section of the class").
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